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When war exploded over the Pacific on 7 December 1941, the 
average American knew little of the Pacific world and its peoples. Al-
though tension in the Pacific between the United States and Japan had 
heightened during the surruner and fall of 1941, few Americans, in-
cluding the press, envisioned a shooting war between the two disputants. 
While diplomatic messages continued through official channels, includ-
ing a personal message from President Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito, 
the American public was shocked into reality by the stunning news that 
Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor. 
Although . momentarily shaken out of its complacency, the 
American public and some of the press, for the most part, believed 
that Japan could be defeated in a short time. But within a month this 
view had to be rejected, £or suddenly, in quick succession, America 
suffered the humiliating loss of Manila~ of Cavite, our largest naval 
base in the Philippines, and the island of Luzon. The one exception was 
Bataan where MacArthur 1s forces had dug in for a heroic stand 
against the enemy. 
The magnificent defense of Bataan by MacArthur and his be-
leagured and outnumbered forces provided a ray of hope in an other-
wise sad story of defeats during the ear ly months of the Pacific war. 
The whole country took the general and his men unto their hearts. 
While the editorials of almost all the newspapers viewed MacArthur 1s 
defense of the Philippines as gallant throughout, they had serious mis-
givings about administration leadership and were highly critical of its 
conduct of the war in the Pacific. 
When the Allied cause in the Pacific reached a new low in 
February, the American press began to demand that MacArthur be 
ordered out of the Philippines to lead a unified Allied effort in the 
Pacific. When the administration failed to act and sent troops to Great 
Britain instead, the editorials of the American press became very 
critical. And when Bataan and Corregidor fell the editoria l denuncia-
tions against the administration reached new heights. 
T his thesis is a study of how the United States press viewed, 
analyzed, and reported the epochal events in the Philippines during the 
period 8 December 1941 to 8 May 1942. It examines the military 
plans and the political and national factors that had great significance 
for MacArthur 1s defense of the Philippines as well as the Allied efforts 
in the Pacific to halt the Japanese juggernaut. This work is based on 
the interpretation of information gathered primarily from about sixty-five 
newspapers, from examination of other source material pertinent to 
the subject, and from several personal interviews. 
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THE PACIFIC WORLD IN BRIEF PERSPECTIVE 
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and on the military in-
stallations in the Philippines caught the United States and the military 
commanders in each of these areas by surprise. Japan1 s actions pre-
cipitated the Pacific War and made the United States an active partner 
of the Allied cause against the three Axis nations, Japan, Germany and 
Italy. 
It would be difficult to understand G eneral Douglas M acArthur 1 s 
defense of the Philippines during the first few months of the Pacific War 
without some mention of the Pacific Ocean. A word or two is also 
necessary concerning the Philippines, Japan and the United States. Nor 
can one omit some comments on MacArthur himself. 
The Pacific Ocean,wbich is about 500,000,000 million years 
old and contains almost one half of the water area of the world, is twenty 
times the size of the United S tates. At its widest part, between Panama 
and the coast of Indo-China, it is about 12,000 miles. The distance 
from San Francisco to Manila is about 7 1 500 miles. To those responsi-
ble for planning and conducting warfare or transporting 1nen and 
material on, over, or under the surface of its vast expanse, the 
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Source: New York Ti mes, 21 December 1941. MAP 1 
Compa r ative Distences from Tokyo and San Franc i sco 
3 
Pacific represents a nightmare (Map 1). 
One of the largest and most significant of all archipelagos in 
the Pacific is the Philippines which is composed of about 7, 100 islands. 
It has a land area of nearly 115~ 707 square miles and extends 4 degrees 
to 20 degrees north latitude for a distance of 1, 150 miles. In 1941 its 
population was approximately 16,500,000.1 Because of its location in 
the geographic heart of the Far East, it was a prerequisite for Japants 
successful march to the south. It was one of the vital points the Japanese 
had to neutralize before she could successfully invade the oil rich 
Netherlands Indies. Possession of this strategically important archipel-
ago would lessen the danger of a flank attack by United States forces in 
the Philippines against the Japanese as they moved southward. 
Once under the power of Spain, the Philippines were claimed 
by the United States at the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898. 
America1s refusal to grant immediate independence--a cause she had 
embraced--to the Filipinos sparked an insurrection led by Emilio 
Aguinaldo who had h elped the Americans to capture Manila.. This de-
cision made the United States a colonial power in the Far East with the 
responsibility for the maintenance of peace and the "status quo" in that 
part of the world. 2 
1Fairfield Osborn, (ed.) . The Pacific World, (New York: 
Norton and Co. , Inc. , 1944), p. 113. 
2 Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, (Washington: Uo S. 
Government Printing Office, 1963}, p. 3. .Hereinafter cited as Morton, 
Philippines. 
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The Filipinos progressed so rapidly under American tutelage 
that by 1916 they had almost complete control of their domestic affairs. 
In 1934 Congress passed the Tydings-McDuffie Act which provided for 
the independence of the Philippines on 4 July 1946. This action was 
fully indorsed by the United States War Department which had looked 
upon the Philippines, "located as they were in waters dominated by the 
Japanese forces," l as a liability. 
In 1935 the Philippines Commonwealth elected Manuel Quezon 
as its first president. Although the Filipinos were considered politically 
mature and strong enough economically to take over the responsibility 
of their government, they had no qualified military leader to organize 
and lead the defense of the islands. In search of such a person, Mr. 
Quezon convinced General Douglas MacArthur, then United States Army 
Chief of Staff, to accept the posi tion as head of the Philippine defense 
organization. President Franklin D . Roosevelt 1 s approval paved the 
way for his transfer to the Philippines as a military adviser. 
When President Quezon invited MacArthur to take over the top 
defensive mil itary post in the Philippine armed forces, his was a name 
well known in the islands. The name was first introduced there by his 
father, General Arthur MacArthur. It is with the father that the Mac-
Arthur legend begins there. During the Philippine insurrection he com-
manded the American troops in the islands. His kindly treatment of 
1Chicago Tribune, 27 December 1941, p. 10. 
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Aguinaldo and his followers and of the Filipinos gave the MacArthur 
name special meaning in the Philippines and was repaid forty years 
later in loyalty and devotion to his son. Both MacArthurs had a 
breadth of feeling for the individual that made them capable of com-
passion for the Asian--particularly the Filipino. 
MacArthur was born at Fort Dodge, an army post in Arkansas, 
on 26 January 1880. His paternal ancestors, prominent in Scotland's 
history for over a thousand years, fought with Robert the Bruce for 
Scottish independence. A Scottish proverb states: ''There is nothing 
older--unless the hills--MacArtair and the devil. 111 He entered West 
Point in 1899 and graduated at the head of his class in 1903. Upon 
graduation, he was commissioned a Second Lieutenant, Engineer Corps, 
and sent to the Philippines. This was the first of his three tours of duty 
to the islands which he came to know so intimately. As one American 
newspaper said: 11H e knew the Filipinos from the cabinet members to 
the cocheros who drove the little carromatas. 112 
During his long and distinguished career he served eight presi-
dents, beginning with President Theodore Roosevelt in 1903 and ending 
with his dismissal by Harry S. Truman in 1951. His exploits and cool-
ness while under enemy fire in World War I became legendary. His 
ability to organize and lead under adverse battle conditions won for him 
1Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences, (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Co. Inc. , 1964), p. 26. 
2Dallas Morning News, 3 March 1942, p. 7. 
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a rapid promotion to the rank of brigadier general, one of the youngest 
in the American Expeditionary Forces. An index to his leadership 
during World War I is shown in a commendation from his Corps Com-
mander, General Charles P. Summerall, which r ead: 
.•• G e neral Douglas MacArthur has manifested the 
highest soldierly qualities and has r e ndered services of 
the greatest valor. • • • During this advance the enemy 
£ought and resorted to hand-to-hand combat. • • • For 
his leadership during three days of combat, I am happy 
to recommend to you for the second time that he be made 
a Major General. 1 
From 1919 to 1922 he served as Superintendent of West Point, 
the youngest man to hold that position. In 1931 he was appointed by 
President Herbert Hoover to be the United States Army Chief of Staff 
and thus became the youngest living four-star general. One of his 
most agonizing duties was to drive the Bonus Marchers of 1932 out of 
Washington. His actions aroused a deep abiding bitterness in the hearts 
of many Americans. In 1934 his term as Chief of Staff was extended 
for one year by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the first Chief of 
S taff so honored. In 1935 he departed from the United States to take up 
his new duties in the Philippines. His small staff included Major Dwight 
D. Eisenhower, late r General and President. 
On 24 August 1936 he accepted the rank of Field Marshal and 
the baton which symbolized its rank. His speech, following the presen-
tation, was headlined in the Manila Tribune on 25 August "PREPARE 
1Frazier Hunt, The Untold S t ory of Douglas M acArthur, (New 
York: D evin-Adair Co., 1964, p. 88. MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 
67. 
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OR PERISH--MACARTHUR. 11 The speech was intended as an appeal to 
the Filipinos to develop their own defense or die. Eisenhower, who was 
at the presentation, disapproved of MacArthur 1 s acceptance and looked 
upon the title of Field Marshal as having certain comic overtones. 1 
Eisenhower ts opinion was shared by a few of the American columnists 
who had a field day with such epithets as the "Napoleon of Luzon. 11 2 By 
accepting the unprecedented r ank of Field Marshal, he became the first 
American citizen so honored. 
On 30 April 1937, MacArthur married Miss Jean Faircloth in 
a civil marriage ceremony in New York City. 3 This was his second 
marriage. His first marriage to the socialite Louise Cromwell of 
Baltimore in 1922, which ended in divorce in l 92 9, was headlined as 
the "Ma rriage of M ars and Millions. 11 4 In his sixtieth year, MacArthur 
was blessed with a son~ the only child born of the two marriages. 
From 1935 to 1941 he carried out his plan to organize and 
train the Philippine Army. His two goals wer e to train 400, 000 men 
by 1946 and to change the Philippines from a tempting prize for the 
Japanese to a rugged fortress they would hesitate to attack. He achieved 
neither goal. 
1Bob Considine, General Douglas MacArthur 1 (Greenwich: 
Fawcett Inc., 1964), p. 60. 
2Dallas Morning News, 3 March 1942, p. 7. 
3MacArthur , Reminiscences, p. I 06. 
4Denver Post, 23 February 1942, p. 1. 
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The Japanese, a hardy, industrious and vigorous race, emerged 
from the cocoon of their isolation when Commodore Mathew Perry opened 
her door in 1853. Unlike China, however, Japan did not wait to be dis-
sected by the Western Powers. Her modernization, a consequence of 
her adapting western technology and institutions to suit her needs, was 
one of the amazi ng phenomena of modern history. Out of this readiness 
to seize new methods and new ideas there soon emerged an aggressive 
and expansionist foreign policy to serve her own militant ends. 
In 1895 Japan defeated China and extended her influence to the 
Asian mainland, thus becoming an Asiatic power. Her decisive mili-
tary victory over Russia in 1905, made her the fir st Oriental nation to 
defeat a Western nation. By 1910, when Japan annexed Korea, she was 
accepted as an emerging world power. 
Out of the victory over Russia in 1905 there developed, within 
a small group of militarists, an animosity toward the United States. 
Highly dissatisfied with the Treaty of Portsmouth of Septe mber 1905, 
the militarists were convinced that Japan had been denied the full 
fruits of victory because of America1 s involvement in the peace talkso 
This small and then seemingly innocuous animosity, which began during 
Theodore Roosevelt1s presidency, increased over the years. A long 
series of misjudgments and misunderstandings finally culminated in the 
dramatic events of December 1941. 
During World War I.l Japan seized the former German islands 
of the Marianas, the Caroline and the Marshalls. Although she officially 
9 
re signed from the League of Nations on 2 7 March 1933, Japan was allowed, 
with the sanction of the Council of the League, to continue her mandate 
over the islands she held. 1 This action had far reaching effect in the 
early 19401s for they provided her with a fortified screen and points for 
attacks against the United States forces in the Pacific. 
The decades of the 11 twenties 11 and 11 thirties 11 in Japan were 
years of bitter internal strifes between the military, who had ambitious 
schemes of expansion by force, and the important industrial families 
which, taking the United States as a model, prospered on international 
trade. 2 The industrialists, however, were no match for the Army 
whose minister could go over the head of the Premier to consult with 
the Emperor. Of greater personal importance to a dissident minister 
was the system of patriotic assassinations which the militarists had 
developed. 3 
In 1941, Japan, taking advantage of events in Europe, pursued 
with greater vigor her expansionist policy in China and S.outheast Asia--
particularly Indo-China. Her rapid expansion and her desire to create 
a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere alarmed the United States 
and Great Britain. In order to restrain the Japanese, President 
lMeribeth E. Cameron, et. al. China, Japan and the Powers, 
(New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1952), p. 408. 
2St. Louis Post Dispatch, 9 December 1941, Part 3, p. l. 
3See in particular, Hugh Byas, Government by Assassination, 
{New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942). 
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Roosevelt in mid-1941 froze all Japanese as sets in the United States 
and placed an embargo on all oil shipments to Japan. With the latter 
measure, Roosevelt had struck at Japan1 s most sensitive spot. Oil 
was the life blood of her economy, particularly of her vast war machine. 
Without it she could not continue her program of expansion for long. 
In fact if her supply became too low she could not even go to war. 
By Octobe r 1941, Japan had only enough oil to carry on armed 
conflict for eighteen months. She was desperate. That month, politi-
cal pressure from the 1nilitarists and the extreme nationalists forced 
Prince Furnimaro Konoye, the Prime Minister, whom they considered 
ineffectual, to resign. He was replaced by the dynamic and stubborn 
militarist General Hedeki Tojo. With Tojo and the militarists in power, 
civil Government was virtually nonexistent. I 
As the political crisis intensified during November, the demands 
of both countries became more difficult to reconcile. On 26 November 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull sent a strong note to the Japanese Govern-
ment. The two Japanese envoys, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura and 
Saburo Kurusu, after reading the note, were aghast, and saw it as an 
ultimatum which J apan could not accept without humiliation. They pre-
dicted that when it was received in Tokyo the officials would more than 
likely throw up their hands. The note was rejected outright on 27 November. 
1For an excellent biography of Tojo see Robert J. C. Butow, 
Tojo and the Coming of the War, {Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1961). 
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Then Roosevelt, in a dramatic climax to the exchange of diplomatic 
notes, sent a personal message to the Japanese Emperor Hirohito on 
6 December. Japan1 s stunning and shocking answer came the next day, 
at daybreak over Hawaii. 
Even while the diplomatic exchange was going on, Japan had 
already made the fateful decision to go to war. 1 Her invasion fleet was 
steaming out of the North Pacific for Pearl Harbor. On the morning of 
7 December (8th, Philippine time), the militarists efforts were crowned 
with success. With the words 11 To-To-To11 2 signaling the bombing of 
Pearl Harbor, Japan ended eighty-eight years of friendship with the 
United States and set the Pacific world afire. Yet, President Roose-
velt1s foreign policy was not without provocation. Official Washington 
could also take what satisfaction it wanted from the fact that it had de-
sired and to a degree maneuvered the Japanese to fire the first shot. 
Roosevelt had insisted on this point because of his fear that if the United 
States struck the first blow the country would remain divided. 3 
Pearl Harbor was by no means an unmitigated disaster for the 
Americans. Neither could it be considered a complete success for the 
Japanese. However, they gained several advantages by their initial 
lsee Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The Fir st Two 
Years, {Washington: Uo S. Government Printing Office, 1962). 
2Gordon W. Prange, "Tora, Tora, Tora, 11 Reader1 s Digest, 
October-November 1963. 
3Pierre S. R. Payne, The Marshall Story, (New York: 
Prentice Hall, 1951), p. 160. 
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success at Hawaii. For they made it virtually impossible for the United 
States to reinforce the Philippines without extensive losses in men and 
material., The suddenness of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor caught 
the Philippines short of their military goals. 
CHAPTER II 
THE ANTAGONISTS--PLAN- -STRATEGY- -ATTACK 
The t e n years that MacArthur had counted on to create a modern 
Philippine Army of ten divisions , which could defend the islands from 
attack, was cut in half. I n these five years the results were excruciatingly 
slow and painfully disappointing. The citizen-soldier system of con-
scription, under which MacArthur trained the Filipinos, was similar 
to that of Switzerland. The Filipinos would train for a few months and 
then go back to their jobs. Some American newsmen who visited the 
islands and observed their training labeled them, "two for a nickel'' 
soldiers. l 
As the war clouds darkened and tension in the Pacific grew, 
MacArthur was recalled to active duty by Washington and made the com-
mander of the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). 
MacArthur, with the cooperation of Washington, made an eleventh-hour 
attempt to shore up the lagging defensive posture of the Philippines be-
fore the storm broke. The attempt fell short of its mark. Neither the 
Philippines nor the United States were pre pared to face the Japanese 
lnallas Morning News, 3 March 1942, p. 7. 
13 
14 
when hostilities b egan in December. Japan1 s spectacular success in 
the Philippines, then can be attributed as much to MacArthur 1 s and 
America1 s unreadiness as to the spee d and superiority of Japanese 
tactics, troops and equipment. 
The main reasons f or MacArthur 1 s failure to repel the Japanese 
from Philippine shores can be credited for the most part to opposing 
military views ancf:policies, lack of appropriations, lack of time, the 
dilatory action of the Navy, and to MacArthur 1 s own misjudgment. The 
military controversy was centered mostly in the various plans that had 
evolved over the years on how to fight Japan, particularly in the Philip-
pines. 
In 1924, a joint Army-Navy Board suddenly recognized the 
strategic value of the Philippines in the event of a war with Japan. Out 
of this recognition there evolved the various Orange plans that became 
the basic pr.inciple for war in the Pacific. The fir st Orange plan called 
for the Navy to take the offensive and destroy the Japanese fleet, and 
keep the communication lines open to the Philippines. The Army, in 
the meantime, was assigned the mission of defending Manila Bay. 
In 1938 the plan was revised to make the Navy1s move across 
the Pacific a progressive and defensive one rather than a sustained of-
fensive drive. The inherent weakness of this plan was its failure to 
set a time limit for the Navy1 s advance across the Pacific. The Army 
in turn would still defend Manila Bay; however, no provisions were 
made to send men and munitions to supply or to reinforce the defenders. 
15 
For all practical pur poses it was a compromise plan being neither de-
fensive or offensive. While Congress would not abandon the Philippines, 
neither would it grant adequate funds for its defense. 
The latest revision of the Orange Plan came in 1941 when it 
was designated as War Plan Orange No. 3 (WP0-3). 1 This plan had all 
the features of the 1938 plan, and retained almost the same basic mis-
sion. Military action under the WP0-3 was limited to central Luzon. 
I£ this were not possible then the defending troops were to withdraw into 
Bataan .for a last ditch fight to the end. The plan left many things un-
said. For example, no provisions wer e made as to what action would 
be taken after the fall of Bataan. The plan did, however , authorize the 
stockpiling of 180 days of supp lies for 40, 000 men.2 
In October 1941 the Rainbow- 5 plan was introduced. This plan, 
prepared with the cooperation of Great Britain, was world-wide in 
scope and str essed defensive action in the Pacific in the event of global 
war . The basic mission of the Army and the Navy was the same but 
implicit in the p lan was the loss of the Philippines . The planners, for 
the most part, were convinced that no system of fortifications and no 
amount 0£ patrolling the extensive coastline of the Philippines could 
assure an absolute defense against Japan. With the exception of some 
1
Morton, Philippines, p. 61. Morton regards this plan as 
strategically unsound and outdated by 1941 but tactically sound for 
local conditions. Japan1 s blow on Pearl Harbor had rendered the plan 
obsolete. 
2
Morton, Philippines, p. 63. 
,-
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changes and a few individual efforts, little had been done by the United 
States Government to prepare the Philippines for an extensive war with 
Japan. 
MacArthur 1 s position was not an enviable one. When he assumed 
command of USAFFE in July 1941 his total troop strength was 10,473. 
Included in this force were 2,547 Americans and 7, 936 Filipinos . His 
air force was no more than a token force, unable to fight against "even 
a mildly determined and ill-equipped foe. 111 Individual and organizational 
equipment was lacking, and what armament there was, was mostly of 
the World War I type. Military transportation was practically nonexistent. 
Large-scale troop movements were dependent on buses and trucks con-
tracted from civilians. During the summer and fall of 1941 he carried 
out a strong campaign to accelerate the pace of the flow of men and mu-
nitions from the United States to the Philippines. During this period he 
also voiced strong objections to the existing war plans. 
MacArthur firmly opposed both the WP0-3 and the Rainbow-5 
plans. He viewed them as being defensive and defeatist in nature. 
However, it was not until the Rainbow-5 plan was introduced in Octobe r 
that he had an opportunity to forcefully press for the adoption of his own 
plan. The plan he proposed was aggressive and offensive in nature and 
was designed to deny the surrounding waters to a hostile fleet and to 
1 wesley F. Craven and James L . Cate, eds. The Army Air 
Force in World War II, Vol. I, (Chicago: The University Press of 
Chicago, 1948), p. 1 77. Hereinafter cited as Craven, Army Air Force . 
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provide maximum defense of the beaches. The keystone of this plan 
was a formidable force of heavy bombers and fighters which he hoped 
to use against J·apanese communication lines and against any Japanese 
landing force. 
In a strongly worded letter to the War D e partment, h e warned 
that an enemy landing on any southern Philippine island would compro-
mise the defense of Manila Bay or Luzon.I Yet MacArthur 1s plan had 
no positive solution in meeting such a situation when it did occur. The 
Philippine coastline, longer than that of the United States, could not be 
patrolled effectively by Admiral Thomas C. Hart1s Asiatic Fleet, let 
alone by MacArthur1s small fleet of mosquito boats. In view of the 
impending war in the Pacific, MacArthur1 s plan was approved. Wash-
ingtonts new policy involved a sharp r evis ion of its previous attitude. 
MacArthurts impatience drove him to commit one of his few 
military blunders. Without waiting for the necessary men and material, 
he put his plan into operation. 2 This action was partly motivated by his 
arrogant optimism and by his firm belief that war would not come until 
April 1942. 3 By then he hoped that all the necessary reinforcements--
trained officers, competent specialists, trucks, tanks, etc., --would 
1 
Ltr. MacArthur to TAG, 1 Oct 41, subj: Opns Plan Rainbow-5, 
WPD 4178-18. Quoted in Morton, Philippines, p . 65. 
2 This plan was put into effect on 3 December and was the one 
in use when war broke out. It was dropped on 23 December. 
3Richard H. Rovere and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr ., The Mac-
Arthur Controversy and American Foreign Policy, (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 1965), p. 49. 
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have been received from the United States. MacArthur's character was 
such that at times he could not separate reality from fantasy. By his 
action, he compromised the important logistics feature of the WP0-3 . 
This error would have tragic consequences in the defense of Bataan and 
can be said to be one of the most important factors for its eventual fall. 
During November men and munitions began to arrive in increas-
ing numbers. However, because of the lack of ships , the shipments 
were made in small increments. By 1 December, the forces in the 
Philippines, while still inadequate, had been considerably strengthened. 
MacArthur's forces now numbered 31,095 and consisted of 19,107 
Americans and 11, 988 Filipinos. The increase in American strength 
was due to the great influx of Air Corps and Se rvice D e tachment per-
sonnel. On 3 December he confirmed the mission of the four major 
tactical commands which he had e stablished on 4 November. The 
commands were the Northern Luzon Force, the Southern Luzon Force, 
the Visayan-Mindanao Force and a Reserve Force. These forces were 
commanded by Maj. General Jonathan M. Wainright, Brig. G e neral 
G e orge M. Parker, Jr., and Brig. General William F. Sharp respec-
tively. The Reserve Force was under the control of MacArthurts head-
quarters. 
Plans were made to phase in additional troops as they became 
available from local resource s or the States. By 15 Dece mber most 
Filipino trainees and units had been as signed to the ten reserve Philip-
pine divisions which were increased to about I 10, 000 m e n. Although 
19 
poorly trained and ill-equipped, they represented a military force of 
some size,,! Of the 110,000 Filipino troops inducted into service on 19 
D ecember about 50, 000 were on Luzon while the balance was distributed 
on the other major islands of the archipelago. 2 
By 8 December MacArthur's air force, around which centers 
the greatest controversy of the Philippine defense, numbered 307 planes 
of varying size, type and condition. The strength of this force was con-
centrated on thirty-five B-1 '"fs and one hundred and seven P-401 s. There 
had been a progressive increase of planes since the middle of August. 
With this sudden increase and with promises of more to come, Mac-
Arthur requested that M aj. General Lewis Brereton be assigned to his 
command as commander of the new expanding Far East Air Force. The 
request was approved by Washington and Brereton was subsequently 
assigned to the Philippines. 
Rounding out the picture of the military units in the Philippines 
was the U. S. Asiatic Fleet under the command of Admiral Thomas C. 
Hart.. Included in his forces were three cruisers, thirteen destroyers, 
eighteen submarines, six P. To boats, thirty-three seaplanes, one tender 
and one drydock. These then were the forces and the leaders whom the 
Japanese would attack. 
1carlos Romulo, I Saw the Fall of the Philippines, {Garden 
City: Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1943), p. 55. 
2charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, MacArthur; 
1941~1951, (New York: McGraw and Hill, 1954), p. 21. 
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While MacArthur tried to improve his plan, the authorities in 
Washington worked frantically establishing schedules to insure a steady 
flow of men and munitions to the Philippines. Washington now began a 
crash program to offset the years of apathy and inadequate appropria-
tions. Unfortunately, war broke out sooner than expected. However, 
even as hostilities were opened, there was on the high seas a convoy 
of seven ships, under the naval protection of the heavy cruiser Pensa-
cola and the sub-chaser Niagra, steaming towards Manila. The convoy 
carried critically needed pilots and planes as well as two regiments of 
artillery and large amounts of ammunition and supplies. 1 
Unfortunately, the convoy never reached Manila. In the wake 
of the devastating attack against Pearl Harbor, a hasty decision was 
made by a panicky few in Washington to return the convoy to Hawaii. 
After several days of delay, during which the convoy waited in the Fiji 
Islands, a presidential decision was made that the convoy, somehow, 
must reach MacArthur. On 12 December, however, the convoy com-
mander was instructed to continue on to Brisbane, Australia, which he 
proceeded to do, arriving there on 22 D ecember. 2 
MacArthur was notified on 13 December of Washington1 s deci-
sion. His effort to impart his own sense of urgency to Hart and to get 
1Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for 
Coalition Warfare 1941-1942, (Washington: U. S. Government Print-
ing Office, l 953), pp. 72-73. Hereinafter cited as Matloff, Strategic 
Planning. 
21bid. pp. 82-84. 
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him to provide naval vessels to escort the convoy from Brisbane failedo 
MacArthur considered Hart as a defeatist who had already doomed the 
is lands. Hart, on the other hand, was convinced that his forces were 
too weak to provide the n~cessary protection. And on this point he was 
supported by Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations. This 
brought an end to the eleventh-hour attempt to reinforce M acArthur. 
The conquest of the Philippines was conceived by the Japanese 
militarists as part of an over-all war plan. Japan had to take the Philip-
pines in order to protect her flanks against a potential U.S. attack from 
the islands. The Philippines strategically located across her lines of 
communication to the south was a dagger pointed at the very heart of 
her master plan to gain the vital resources of South East Asia. The 
possession of this resources rich area would give Japan control of an 
enormous supply of oil, rubbe r and other essentials which she needed 
to keep her war machine going. At the same time, it would satisfy her 
national objective in going to war. In Japanese eyes, the Philippines 
in the hands of an enemy was unthinkable, for in such hands they repre-
sented an ideal base for an offensive striking power against Formosa 
and eventually J apan itself. 
Japan1 s strategy and initial target in her attack on the Philip-
pines was the destruction of MacArthur 1 s air force . It had to be de-
stroyed in order to protect her invasion fleet and forces during their 
landing phases. MacArthur's planes also presented a serious threat to 
the flanks of the Japanese communication lines to the south 0 Hart1 s 
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Far East Fleet was only of secondary importance to the Japanese who 
felt that as a fighting force it was of negligible value. 1 According to 
the New York Times, Hart1s submarine fleet had only enough torpedo 
power to delay, to harass , and to threaten, but not prevent the arrival 
of an invasion force. 2 
Within ten hours of the devastating blow struck at Pearl Har-
bor, a large force of Japanese bombers and fighters carried out several 
highly successful air raids on Clark Field and the Iba fighter base. 3 
The attacks were brief but destructive for when they were over both 
fields had been turned into a shambles. Seventeen of the nineteen B-l 7 1 s 
and forty of the fighters assembled at Clark were destroyed. By the end 
of the day MacArthur 1s air force had been materially reduced. Actually 
it was virtually a second Pearl Harbor. 
Subsequent air attacks on the battered air fields and installations 
were so successful--incredibly so to the aggressor--that by 12 Decem-
ber MacArthurts air force had been virtually demolished. By the third 
week of the war the fourteen remaining B-171 s were flown to Australia. 
1For a complete breakdown of the composition, status, and de-
ployment of the Asiatic Fleet see Samuel E. Morison, The Rising Sun in 
the Pacific, 1931-1942, Vol. III, (Boston: Little, BrownandCo., 1954), 
pp. 158-59. Hereinafter cited as Morison, Rising Sun. 
2z8 December 1941, p. 4E 
3For precise information on each p lane see Walter D. Edmonds, 
They Fought With What They Had, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 
195 1). 
2,3 
Their operational use in the defense of Luzon and the Philippines had 
come to an inglorious end. After this debacle, Japanese pilots flew 
over the Philippines with complete assurance and with little resistance" 
Many reasons have been advanced as to why so many planes 
were caught on the ground. According to Clarke Lee, an Associated 
Press war correspondent, and author, the main bomber force located 
at Clark Field, forty miles north of Manila, had been airborne that 
morning. They were, however, ordered back to Clark Field to await 
confirmation of a bombing mission against the Japanese airbases on 
Formosa. Due to a series of wrong decisions the planes on landing 
were parked in neat rows like shiny new toys and all arranged in such 
a way as to be an easy target. 1 
For this reason and in this position the first wave of fifty-four 
bombers and eighty-six Zero fighte rs found the core of MacArthur 1s 
air force. The same panorama met the astonished eyes of the Japanese 
bomber and fighter pilots on their approach to Iba. By the time the 
attacks ended, the Japanese left a roaring hell of flames at both bases. 
Some of the planes were saved but the main strength of our vaunte d air 
force was gone. 2, In one stroke Japan had removed the greatest barrier 
to her southward advance with insignificant casualties to he rself. 
This shameful defeat, over shadowed by the catastrophe at 
Pearl Harbor, was unknown to the American press and to the American 
1Daily Argus Leader, 10 April 1942., p. 2.. 
2Ibid. , p. 2.. 
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public- -but not to Washington. MacArthur had reported this loss on 10 
December. However, Washington did not release the story of this s e cond 
humiliating defeat to the American press. The Army Air Force Chief, 
G e neral Henry 1Hap1 Arnold, was so irate that he called Brereton f rom 
W a shington a n d wanted to know "how in the hell' ' he let himself get caught 
in such a predicament. 1 It was on this sour not e that the saga of Mac-
Arthur1s air force came to an inglorious end. What had started out as 
a bright dream ended in a tarnished memory. The question of who was 
to blame will be v e ry difficult to resolve. 
Edmonds, after a long and. exhaustive study, has come to the 
conclusion that it is pointless to place the blame for what happened on 
that day on the shoulders of any particular commander. Although Mac-
Arthur had over-all control as USAFFE commander, Brereton was in 
tactical control as the commander of the Far East Air Force. Edxnonds 
feels that there are too many overriding factors that indirectly l ed to 
the holocaust and to the breakdown in the operation and security of the 
airplanes to p e rmit a valid conclusion. The greatest accusation against 
MacAr thur was that he r e fused to allow the bombers to attack Formosa. 
What effe ct a small fleet of bombers, unprotected by fighte r es c ort, 
flying hundre ds of mile s to attack unknown targe ts, would have had is 
highly que stionable. This is particularly so whe n one considers the fact 
1G e neral Arnold had called Br e reton shortly afte r the P earl 
Harbor attack and warned him not to get caught napping in the same 
way. H e nry H . Arnold, Global Mission, {New York: Harper Bros., 
1949), p. 272. 
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that the Japanese had a total of 751 modern planes 1 which could be 
used to pulverize the attackers. 
Japan1 s ability to strike at several objectives simultaneously 
in the Pacific disproved the experts• prewar assumptions that her mili-
tary machine was capable of striking only one objective at a time. 2 The 
whole point to her attack in the Pacific was that it depended on speed 
and quick success. In order to continue her conquests, it was impera-
tive that she conquer quickly those areas from which she could exploit 
her resources for war, and those areas, such as the Philippines, which 
presented a threat to her southward conquests. The suddenness of her 
attack against the Philippines caught the military commanders there 
by surprise and placed a severe strain on MacArthur 1 s ambitious plan. 
MacArthur1 s vaunted plan, which was to provide a wall of 
steel around the Philippines, failed the first crucial test. Not'\h·ithstand-
ing the glaring headlines in the nation's press of American-Filipino suc-
cesses in the Philippines, there was little or no resistance offered by 
the defenders on the beaches. In the first two weeks of the Philippine 
epic many unconfirmed and unreliable stories appeared in the American 
press. While most of them had an element of truth, some were the 
fabrication of over stimulated minds. Such stories provided the press 
1willoughby, Charles A., Prange , Gordon, W., et. al., Re-
ports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of M acArthur In the Paci-
fic, 2 Vols. (Washington: U0 S0 Government Printing Office, 1966), I , 
6 . Hereinafter cited as Willoughby and Prange, Campaigns of Mac-
Arthur . I or II, Part I. 
2Morison, Rising Sun, p. 187. 
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with a few days of dramatic headlines, but at the same time the Ameri-
can public was given a false idea of what was actually happening there. 
The first Japanese ground action on Luzon did not start until 
10 December. 1 On that day Japanese troops made unopposed landings 
at Aparri and Vigan in northern Luzon. 2 Two days later, a third un-
opposed landing was made at Legaspi, on the southeast tip of the island. 
While the Japanese troops were coming ashore on northern 
Luzon, the headlines in the American press were screaming of a major 
invasion attempt at Lubang, sixty air miles southwest of Manila. The 
Miami Herald1 s headline, which was most representative of those in 
most newspapers, stated: "Slaughter Japanese Force .. 11 3 According to 
the press stories, the courageous American-Filipino defenders fought 
a fantastic all night battle and turned back a huge armada of enemy 
ships. The defenders, continued the stories, frustrated the landing at-
tempts of 154 boat loads of Japanese t roops by blasting them out of the 
water. No one reached the shore alive. The morning light revealed 
no more than the usual debris. There had been neither an invasion 
lThe first landing on Philippine soil was made on Batan 
Island, about 150 miles north of Luzon, on 8 December. 
2Willoughby and Prange, Campaigns of MacArthur, II, Part 
I, 90. For an American view, see Willoughby and Prange, Campaigns 
of MacArthur, I, 7, 10. 
3 10 December 1941, p. 1. Reports of this battle were in-
cluded in MacArthur1 s press release of 14 December 1941. Willoughby 
and Prange, Campaigns of MacArthur, I, 10. 
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attempt nor a battle fought along the shores. The night lights and the 
dim silhouettes had played on the fears of an imaginative guard. His 
firing against dancing phantoms had set off the chain reaction of gunfire 
against ghosts in the night. 
The three actual landings at Aparri, Vigan and Legaspi were 
accomplished with very little of the steadfast resistance reported by 
the p r ess. MacArthur 's troops, mostly inexperienced and ill-equipped, 
were no match for the more disciplined, battle-hardened and better 
equipped Japanese. These landings, labeled by the press as major in-
vasions, wer e, in reality, only the advance e l ements of the main inva-
sion force. Their mission was to capture designated str ategic points 
which would be used as forward air bases and point s of attacks against 
the defenders during later operations. 
The headlines and captions a p pearing in the San F r ancisco 
Chronicle and the Greensboro Daily News, in the early days of the war 
are indicative of the confused reports which were filed from the Philip-
pines by newspapermen assigned there. On 10 December, the San 
Francisco Chronicle reported in a heavy black headline spread across 
seven colunrns, 11Army Wipes Out Japan Foothold in West Luzon. isl 
The Greenboro Daily News in the first ten days reported the war under 
the following headings: 11 Furious War is Raging in Pacific Area. 11 2 
110 D ecember 1941, p. 1. 
23 December 1 941, p. 1. 
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"Philippine Landing is Reported, Manila Blasted. 111 11 Little Japanese 
Shopkeeper Found to be Army Leader. 11 2 "Landing of 1chute1 Troops 
Reported. 11 3 
By the end of the first week of war the Japanese were well en-
trenched on Luzon. In an "off the record" interview on 12 December, 
MacArthur told newspapermen that it was impossible for him to defend 
all the beaches with the small forces at his disposal, and "that the ad-
vance landings were made to tempt him to spread his forces. 114 His 
basic principle, he said, was "to hold them intact until the enemy com-
mitted himself in force. 11 5 
Even before the war was a week old, urgent appeals for imme -
diate help poured into Washington. The Philippine Commissioner, 
Francis B. Sayre, made the first a ppeal for effective help. 11Those of 
us who heard Mr. Sayre, 11 said the Wheeling News Register, " could not 
help but be stirred and at the same time exasperated and distressed at 
our helplessness to do something. 11 6 A week later the Cleveland Plain 
19 December 1941, pp. 1 , 2. 
319 December 1941, Po 7. 
2 13 December 1941, p. 1. 
4 Lt. Col. H. K. Johnson, "Defense Along the Abucay Line, 11 
Military Review, Volo XXVIII, Number 11, February 1944, p. 43. 
States that MacArthur 1 s idea of a stand on the beach was given no more 
than lip service. The main concern, he contends, rested with plans to 
withdraw as lar ge a force as possible into Bataan. 
5Romulo, I Saw the Fall of the Philippines, p. 55. 
612 December 1941, p. 4. 
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Dealer reported that a much stronger appeal from Quezon had been re-
ceived in Washington. Mr. Quezon, the Plain Dealer reported, stated: 
"aid was indispensable to the defenders of America1 s island protectorate 
and must come from the United States. 111 
On 20 December , a 5,000 man Japanese force in fourteen trans-
ports invaded Davao, the largest city on the southern island of Mindanao. 
The only resistance to the landing came from a lone machine gun which 
was eventually silenced by a direct hit from a Japanese shell. 2 The re-
sistance was quickly overcome and the small defending force of 3,500 
were pushed back. By late afternoon both Davao and its airfield had 
been taken by the Japanese., 
The most representative headlines in the United States press 
appeared in the New York Times: "BIG JAP F ORCE IN MINDANAO, 
BATTLE RAGES, 113 HEAVY FIGHTING OFF DAVA00 114 Although the 
resistance had been slight, the press treated the small engagement as 
though it were a major battle. The most fantastic account was printed 
by the St. Louis Post Dispatch: "The Americans have taken a considerable 
toll of Japanese ships, planes, and men but have made no effort so far 
to drive the enemy out by land assault. 11 5 Commented the Baltimore 
Sun: "The landing at Davao was the first official report from Manila of 
120 December 1941, pp. 1, 3. 
320 December 1941, p. 1. 
521 December 1941, p. 1. 
2Morton, Philippines, p. 113. 
421 December 1941, p. 1. 
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any attempt by the Japanese to obtain a foothold on any island other than 
Luzon. 11 1 The Daily Oklahoman remarked: "In taking Davao, the Japanese 
clamped the lid on the 1hot hinge of the South Pacific gate 1 and shattered 
MacArthur rs hope for reinforcements by ships through that port. 11 2 
In analyzing the continuing extraordinary military successes 
of Japan, the nation1 s press was agreed on several points. One, the 
Japanese campaign had been car efully prepared; two, air power contrib-
uted most to their success; three, even after the element of surprise 
was no longer a factor, Japan had developed a strategy beautifully suited 
to ocean and island warfare. 3 The Philadelphia Inquirer also attributed 
Japan1 s success to the system of unity of command, which, according to 
the Inquirer, placed " every fighting arm--land, sea, and air--under 
one man whose job it is to boss and win a campaign. 114 Morton points 
out that the coordi nation and razor sharp timing which gave the press 
the impression of a unified command was misleading. "Although there 
were no provisions made for unified command of the services, separate 
agreements were made between Army and Fleet commanders for each 
operation. 11 5 
The Albuquerque Journal saw in Japan1s victories not so much 
her fighting ability but rather her strategy. "She spent freely her 
120 December 1941, p. 1. 220 December 1941, p. 1. 
3D etroit Free Press, 7 March 1942, p. 8b. 
47 March I 942, p. 2 o. 5Morton, Phillipines, p. 56. 
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greatest resources - -manpower, and she put more men, more planes, 
more ships, and more firepower where she opened the fighting. 111 Ac-
cording to the Emporia Daily Gazette, Japan1 s success was due to her 
strategy of ''establishing land bases near the next objective so that 
Japanese aircraft coul d pound their adver saries without travel ing great 
distances. 112 
With its l imited objective won, with the vaunted American Navy 
nowhere in sight and cleared from the Philippine waters, and with Mac-
Arthur1s air force made ineffective, the Japanese were ready for the 
next stage of the Luzon battle--their main drive into the Philippines. 
12 Januar y 1942, p. 10. 223 January 1942, p. 4. 
CHAPTER III 
BATTLE FOR LUZ ON 
The fate of the Philippines was sealed on 22 December. The 
long awaited blow came in the early morning hours of that day when the 
Japanese troops, under strong navy escort, landed in force along the 
coast of Lingayen Gulf (Map 2). The area where the Japanese had 
chosen to land is a natural landing point for an invading expedition. An 
American newspaper called this location "the strategic center of Ameri-
can power in the archipelago. ,il 
Surprise was not the keynote of Japan1 s invasion of Lingayen 
Gulf for patrolling there was the submarine Stingray. It immediately 
radioed a message reporting the presence of the huge enemy convoy of 
about eighty transports. When news of the invasion fleet reached 
General Headquarters, USAFFE, MacArthur requested an all-out 
submarine attack. Five submarines were ordered out to intercept the 
approaching force, but, unfortunately, they arrived too late to inflict a 
major blow on the troop ships while they were still in deep water. How-
ever, two of the submarines, the S-38 and the Seal, did succeed in 
1washington Evening Star, 23 December 1941, p. A-1 O. 
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sinking the transport Hayo Maru on 22 December and the freighter 
Hayatka Maru on 23 December respectively. Although the seaplane 
tender Sanuki Maru received two direct hits from an a lert shore bat-
tery, she continued operations . I 
General MacArthur 1 s headquarters, in reporting the presence 
of the invasion force, announced: ''Early today an undetermined number 
of Japanese landed some one hundred miles north of Manila £ro1n a 
Japanese flotilla of eighty transports. Fighting is raging between the 
Port of Lingayen and the town of Agoo. 11 The USAFFE announcement 
ended with the comment that "the enemy was pushing the attack. 11 2 
The two most representative headlines appearing in the Ameri-
can press on the invasion were those of the Boston Globe: 11 80 Jap Laden 
Ships Of.( Luzon U . S . Ready, 113 and the Baltimore San: "JAPS OFF 80 
TRANSPORTS PUSH NEW LUZON ATTACKS. 114 When reporting the 
size of the invasion fleet the A1nerican press was rather consistent and 
as a rule gave accurate figures of the nwnber of transports involved. 
However, this consistency did not hold true when the U. S. 
press reported on the number of Japanese troops involved in the Philip-
pine invasion. On this subject the nation's press was very inconsistent 
lThe others were the Saury, Samon and the S-40. For a 
complete composition of the invading forces see Morison, Rising Sun, 
p. 161-163. 
2Baltimore Sun, 22 December 1941, p . 1. 
322 December 1941, p. 1. 422, December 1941, p . 1. 
~---======-=-=~- -........--
34 
and was n ever able to achieve an equitable balance between the actual 
numbers involved and those reported to the public. As the battles in-
c r eas e d in numbers and intensity the invaders increased in quantity. 
With the ex ception of the Baltimore Su~ which e stimated an enemy force 
as low as 30,000, 1 most press headlines r eflected between 80,000 to 
100,000 enemy troops involved in the main landing of 22 December. 
On 22 Dec embe r the Sun commented that military observers 
had determined that e ighty transports were capable of carrying between 
30, 000 to 50,000 tr oops. On 23 December its editorial increas e d the 
low figur e s of the previous day to a new estimate of about 80, 000 to 
100,000. Then, on 25 December its military analyst, M a rk S. Watson, 
on the basis of the 100 transports observed in Luzon waters, computed 
the Japanese for ce as of that date to be 125,000. Even the normally 
sedate New York Times was caught off ba lance in the number of 
Japanese troops it listed as being in the Philippines. 
On 23 De cember, the New York Times r eported 11 80, 000 
JAPANESE ATTACK ON LUZON COAST$" On the same day i t stated 
that a War D e pa rtment communique from Washington had e stimate d the 
number of J a panese in Luzon to be from 80,000 to 100, 000. On 25 De .. 
cember, the Times revised its e stimate again in a page one story when 
it stated: " J aps in Luzon put at 200, 000. 11 On 23 J a nuary 1942, it im-
plied that as many as 500,000 enemy troops were in the Philippines; 
however, it immediately revised this figure to a more conservative but 
1Ibid. 
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still excessive 200,000.1 Other representative figures quoted by the 
American press fluctuated between 100,000 and 300, 000 0 
2 These 
figures as a rule were subject to change and often varied in accordance 
with the intensity of the battles or the number of transports sighted off 
Luzon. 
While other newspapers quoted specific figures, the Emporia 
Gazette in its editorial, "Shall We Save MacArthur, 11 stated: 11Still the 
Japanese are coming to the islands by the thousands whereas MacArthur 
has less than SO, 000. 11 3 
The Japanese troop strength figures quoted by the American 
press were completely unrealistic and inconsistent with the facts. First, 
since the conquest of the Philippines was a secondary objective for the 
J a panese, the number of troops projected for this operation was limited; 
second, and more important, Japan did not possess unlimited manpower. 4 
This was scored several months later when one American newspaper 
remarked that it was the considered opinion of qualified military experts 
123 January 1942, p. I. 
2see !or example, Newark Star Ledger, Philadelphia Inquirer, 
Miami Herald, and the Minnesota Star Journal among many during the 
period 22 December 1941 and 8 February 1942. Also see the Chicago 
Daily News during this same period for its estimates which fluctuated 
between 200,000 and 500,000. 
329 F e bruary 1942, p. I. 
4Japan1s military strength was 6 , 983,000. Of these, 2,500,000 
w e re in Japan and the balance were in China or on the Pacific islands. 
MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 285. See also Morton, Philippines, for 
the Organization and Disposition 0£ Japanese Army, p. 55. 
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in Australia that in the Japanese campaign in Malaya, the Netherland 
East Indies, the Philippines, and throughout the i s land territories in the 
Australia neighborhood, the Japanese never used more than 500, 000 
troops. Then it added: 
It has been a common practice for our apologists to blame 
Japanese success so far on a so-called unlimited supply of 
manpower. Yet, almost to a man, our most capable military 
leaders are agreed that this is a totally fallacious a r gument.I 
And finally because of other high p r iority missions, shipment of men 
and equipment to the Philippines were curtailed. Why, then, the astro-
nomical figures? Were they deliberately fabricated to sell newspapers 
or were they honest mistakes, written on the basis of emotion rather 
than fact, or were the figures intentionally "managed"? 
The reasons are varied. For one thing, the first casualty of 
war is generally the truth. Then, too, newspapermen captivated by the 
drama of the events of war accepted estimates of troop strength from 
front line soldiers or from civilian eyewitnesses without question or 
without verification from authoritative sources . A further motive, since 
war provides the ingredients for a real heart-throbbing human-interest 
story, may have been the desire of over-anxious reporters to score a 
"scoop" and give their editor the "Big Story. rr Such stories can be 
dramatized for several days while increasing sales. A four th explana .. 
tion for the exaggerated troop strength was the slanting of news by 
1chicago Sunday Tribune, 14 April 1942, p. 1. 
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MacArthur 1 s headquarters .I This latter possibility cannot be discounted 
and may have been the greatest factor in the start of the legend that the 
Japanese invaders in the Philippines greatly outnumbered the defending 
forces . 
Two examples, both practiced by USAFFE, illustrate this point. 
One, by not giving out at the scheduled press confer ences the specific 
number of enemy troops involved, misconceptions could easily be 
established at the outset. Two, by the use of ambiguous words or 
phrases in communiques or press releases, such as "outnumbered" by 
a battle-hardened force, invaded by an "undetermined number" of enemy 
troops, "overwhelming number s , 11 or "numerically superior" forces, 
everything but c l a rity entered the picture. Such terms often lead to 
generalization and to the inconsistencies which were very obvious in the 
headlines and lead stor ies of the American press. 
On 24 December, the Baltimore Sun, in quoting a press con-
ference held by USAFFE, remarked that heavy fighting was going on in 
the north and that at one point Japanese destroyers were driven off by 
our heavy guns. An official spokesman at the conclusion of his conference, 
the Sun reported, stated that the "news at hand was good news . 11 Yet on 
this same day another official notice r eleased by USAFFE indicated that 
a greatly outnumbered American-Filipino force was battling violently 
against a new Japanese invasion army which had landed along Lamon 
lFor an excellent contrast of American and Japanese views, 
see Willoughby and Prange, Campaigns of MacArthur, Vol. I, fo r the 
American view and Vol. II, Part I, for the Japanese view. 
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Bay coast. According to the announcement, this new invasion force had 
landed from twenty-four heavily loaded transports during the early morn ... 
ing hours of 24 December at Atimonan and Mauban and were about 
seventy-five miles from Manila {Map 2). 
Whil e most newspapers mentioned the presence of twenty-four 
transports, the Baltimore Sun reported " 40 Ships Land 7 5 Miles From 
Manila. 11 It then added that observers here interpreted the latest inva-
sion as "an attempt to make MacArthur split his forces and thus weaken 
the resistance on the northern front where his men are standing off 
another invasion army against great odds. 111 
Despite the estimates of Japanese troop strength given in the 
United States press, the number of Japanese soldiers which opposed 
MacArthur 1s forces bet.ween 8 and 28 December totalled approximately 
64, 000. 2 The initial landings on Luzon numbered about 8, 500 troops. 
The invasion of Davao involved approximately 5,000 men, but 3, 500 of 
these were shipped to other war zones shortly after. The Lamon Bay 
force equaled approximately 7,000 sol diers and the Lingayen Bay force 
which the press reported as totalling about 100,000 actually totalled 
43, 110 and was subdivided as follows : 
124 December 1941, p. 3 . 
2Morton, Philippines, pp. 100, 103, 106, 109, 125, 139. 
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Total 43, 1101 
The arrival of this large force concluded the shipment of large 
si~e units to the Philippines until M arch when the Japanese command 
diverted units up to division strength from other battle areas. By the 
end of March Japanese reinforcements totalled approximately 30,000. 
Included in this figure wer e 7, 000 replacements for the casu a lties suf-
fered by the invaders since the initial landings. 
A computation of the available figures reveals that by 1 April 
Lt. General Masa haru Homma, Commanding Gene ral of the Japanese 
14th Army, had approximately 94, 000 army personnel in the Philippines. 
Since these figures refer almost exclusively to armf personnel, it is 
possible that by mid-May the number of Japanese from all military ser-
vices in the P hilippines equaled almost twice that figur e before they 
were diverted to other high prior ity areas. 2 
The majority of units that MacArthur had in position along Lin-
gayen Gulf to oppose Homma1 s landing force consisted of inadequately 
trained and ill-equipped troops. 3 There was a scarcity of division 
1Letter, Chief of Hist. SSUSA to G-2 GHQ FEC, Nov 9 48, 
3rd Ind., Aug 16 49 : Morton, Philippines, p. 125. 
2Willoughby and Prange , Campaigns of MacArthur, II, Par t I, 
122. P range sets the figur e at 191,939, as follows: Army 12 9,435, 
Air Force 12,752, Navy 49,752. 
3The Philippine Army fought with cast-off weapons of World 
War I, with some types of ammunition that seldom exploded. See 
General Clifford Bluemel' s letter, Appendix D. 
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artillery and many men lacking the most rudimentary knowledge of mili-
tary tactics. One unit, the 71st Infantry Regiment, 71st Infantry Divi-
sion, had been rushed into the breech after a training period of only ten 
weeks. 1 This was an impossible situation for unseasoned troops who 
without benefit of adequate training were being asked to repel one of the 
best trained forces in the world. Unlike his American trainee counter-
part who had had a year or more of strenuous training, the Filipino re-
cruit was forced to complete his training on the actual field of battle, 
often in a matter of hours. 2 
Other units along the beaches were the 26th Cavalry (PS)3 and 
the 12th Infantry (PA). 4 The 12th, waiting on the beach, was equipped 
with one • 50 caliber machine gun and several • 30 caliber machine guns 
which due to 1nalfunctions were soon out of action. The gun crew of the 
larger gun caught many Japanese in its murderous bursts and inflicted 
heavy casualties until destroyed by a direct hit. 
Not all the Filipino defenders were valiant or fought h e roically 
in their first baptism of fire. Many broke and ran. Unseasoned troops 
as a rule cannot b e compe lled to stand and offer resistance and these 
Filipino units were no exception. But those who stood their ground 
fought gallantly and retreated grudgingly. Notwithstanding the individual 
lMorton, Philippine s, p. 131. 
2nenver Post, 7 Tucember 1941, p. 1. 
3 (PS) - Philippine Scout 4(PA) - Philippine Army 
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acts of heroism, MacArthur1 s troops were no match for the more disci-
plined and better equipped invader who enjoyed the mastery of the sea and 
skies around Luzon. 
By 25 December the Japanese had gained seven strong footholds 
on L uzon (Map 2) and began to set what they hoped would be a trap for 
MacArthur. Pressing from several points simultaneously, Homma 
hoped to catch the defenders in the middle when the jaws of his giant 
pincer were slammed shut. His plan failed. MacArthur refused to be 
duped. He was too experienced a commander to allow his forces to be 
crushed by such a movement and destroyed in detail. 
To better coordinate the efforts of his forces, on 24 December 
MacArthur moved into the field with an advance element of his headquar-
ters. A rear echelon remained in Manila to destroy everything of value 
to the enemy and to keep the communication lines open. When the rear 
echelon left Manila on New Year 1s Eve to join the e lements in the field 
most supplies of value had been destroyed} MacArthur had decided to 
forego even a token defense of Manila and declare it an open city. 
To spare Manila, on 26 December MacArthur declared the 
capital an open city. His action was both condemned and praised. One 
of the most biting and sarcastic comments came from the Soviet paper 
Pravda, the official mouthpiece of the Soviet Government. Labeling 
" the action as cowardly,_ 112 it likened the move to 11 Petain1 s 11 tactics 
1Morton, Philippines, p. 165. 
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that gave the enemy an open passage to a country. It. called the failure 
of MacArthur to transform Manila into a Trobruk or Leningrad an act 
of cowardice. 
In sounding out official Washington1 s reaction to Pravda1 s 
views, the San Francisco Chronicle was informed that Washington had 
no desire to stir up controversy with the Russians and that 11our people 
were under a most skillful fighter. 11 1 Completely satisfied with M ac-
Arthur1s method, the War Department described his conduct of operation 
as ••masterful. 112 Even the strategists familiar with the defense situa-
tion 11 have nothing but high praise for the foresight and courage of Mac-
Arthur. 11 3 The Los Angeles Times called MacArthur1 s decision on Manila 
a brilliant piece of strategy and added: 11A less able tactician might 
have elected to make a last-man defense of the city until there was no 
chance of escape. 114 Such valor, questionable at best, would have re-
sulted in destruction to the city and his army. 
MacArthur 1 s action, to begin with, was not new. The decision 
not to defend Manila had been inherent in the various Army-Navy war 
plans for the Philippines. Bataan and Corregidor, not the capital, were 
to be the key to the defense of Manila Bay. The plans had never antici-
pated or desired that a last ditch stand would be made in the defense of 
lsan Francisco Chronicle, 2 January 1942, p. 7. 
2Ncw York Times, 2 January 1942, p. 1. 
3Nevada State Journal, 24 December 1941, p. 1. 
4 3 January 1942, p. 4 . 
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the capitalo Manila had no strategic value and, while it had some 
political significance as the capital of the Philippines, it was mili-
tarily indefensible. 
MacArthur 1 s decision to yield the city as soon as he did found 
support in some of the nation1 s press. The Cleveland Plain Dealer, 
for example, in a two-column header on 3 January thought he would 
make a "stubborn stand on soil of his own choosing. 11 In abandoning 
Manila, the Providence Journal belie ved that "MacArthur had no choice 
and that the responsibility comes back to the United States. 11 1 
But not every editor favored MacArthur's move. An unnamed 
Eastern editor in a strongly worded telegram to the President and to 
the War Department bitterly condemned the removal of all defenses 
and the decision to make Manila an open city. It attributed the death 
and destruction created by the Japanese bombs to MacArthur 1 s deci-
sion which allowed the Japanese to attack in comparative safety without 
fear of reprisal. In commenting on this issue, the Indianapolis Star 
declared: 11 It is a long way from the Eastern seaboard of this country 
to Manila, and we suspect that G eneral MacArthur knows what he is 
doing much better than a carping critic here. rr2 
MacArthur 1s unilateral decision to declare Manila an open 
city was not acceptable to the Japanese. American troops, Tokyo 
l 3 January 1942, p. 9. 
2auoted from the Newcastle Courier Times, 10 January 1942, 
p. 10. 
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stated, continued to maintain positions around M anila and to pass through 
it. While the city s tood stripped of its air defenses, the Japanese bombed 
it on 27 December. 1 This bombing proved a tactle ss act and a great 
blunder on the part of the Japanese. The bitter anger and condemna-
tion which it produced only helped to stiffen Filipino resistance and 
prepare Lhc way for eventual attacks on Japanese cities . 
The Japanese had offered to spar e Manila and consider the 
capital an open city if Lhe Filipino forces would cease a ll resistance. 
Their refusal brought. the Japanese bombers back again on 2.8 December. 
Entire blocks of the historical walle d town 11Intramuros 11 were laid waste 
as churches, schools, and public buildings were bombed and destroyed. 
On the following day the bombers returned t o bomb the shipping and port 
area. 
Senator George W. Norris (Ind-Ne b . ) expressed what appeared 
Lo be Allied sentiment when he asserted that the Japanese had dis r egar ded 
all rule s of warfar e and in turn could claim no immunity under such 
rules . He further stated: "Their cities are open to attack; when we 
are ready we will burn them off the face of the ear th, and that is what 
they are coming to. 112 Subsequent events proved him right. The B-2.91s 
of General Curtis L eMay1 s 20th Air Force in the Pacific reduced many 
areas of Japanese citi es to ashes by fire-bombs b efor e the atomic holocaust 
lsee, £or example, Baltimore Sun, 2.8 December 1 941 , p . 1, 
among m any. 
2rdaho Sunday Statesman, 2.8 December 194 1, p. 1, among many. 
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of 6 August 1945 at Hiroshima. 
The impending fall of Manila aroused concern in the United 
States for the fate of the Philippines and the best course of action to 
follow. The San Francisco Chronicle saw a need to develop a 11 psychol-
ogy of attack11 l and stripping San Francisco, Boston, and New York if 
necessary to send guns and planes to Manila and Singapore. On the 
basis of the Manila withdrawal , American military strategists gloomily 
predicted the loss of the Philippines before the end of the year. In 
commenting on this prediction the Bismarck Tribune caustically ob-
served: 
Our military strategists are frank to say we cannot 
hold the Philippines. These same men said Russia could 
not last six months but Russian grit proved them wrong. 
American initiative and courage must prove their error 
with r egard to the Philippines. 2 
Then in reference to the importance of Singapore, which it discounted, 
the Bismarck Tribune continued: 
If we rule the Philippines, the value of any other 
holdings will be reduced, for the Philipp ines constitute 
a spearhead aimed directly at the sealanes bet.ween 
Southern Asia and the Japanese homeland. Much depends 
on the speed to reinforce our troops there. It is a risk 
we must take, and in running it we will no doubt suffer 
losses. 3 
On the other hand, the Mobile Register, in support of the 
strategists, discounted the Philippines as a pivotal point in the Far 
East when it stated: 11Singapore is the pivotal and crucial point in 
123 D ecember 1941, p. 4. 
223 D ecember 1941, p. 1. 3 24 December 1941, p. 4 . 
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that area. A defeat at Singapore would be a disastrous loss to those 
nations resisting Japan1 s aggression. It is the focal point of all 
interest in the Far East. 111 
With the war three weeks old and supplies and equipment being 
used at an unprecedented rate, MacArthur, facing a battle of survival, 
began his urgent appeals to Washington on 28 December for food and mili-
tary equipment which were running dangerously low. General Mar-
shalP s promises to extend every effort to send reinforcements and 
equipment as soon as possible helped MacArthur to sustain the faith 
of his troops on Bataan. 2 
On 29 December, most headlines in the American newspapers 
read: 11 F 0 D. R 0 Pledges Philippines' Freedom. 11 3 In a press statement 
to the American people, President Roosevelt promised all the needed 
resources to defeat the enemy. He gave notice to the world that the 
war was a duel that would end in the complete destruction of one bellig-
crent or the other. 11 Japan, 11 he said, "is selected for the grim £ate. 11 
His remarks were followed by those of the Navy's which gave assur-
ance that it, too, was acting to give positive assistance to the Philip-
pines. Both statements pledged to exert strong efforts for the freedom 
and independence of the Philippines . 
118 December 1941, p. 8. 
2M acArthur, Reminiscences, p. 128; Morton, Strategy and 
Command: The First Two Years, p. 185. 
3Philadelphia Inquirer, 29 December 1941, p. 1, among many. 
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The President1s statement confused many people, including a 
large nwnber of the press. When the press stressed that immediate 
aid would be given to the Philippines, a sharp rebuke from the White 
House indicated that this was not what the President intended. Accord-
ing to the New York Times, after it had analyzed the speech, the Presi-
dentts pledges were "in terms of the ultimate rather than in terms of 
the immediate. rrl 
This confusion only served to focus the attention of the press 
once again on the anguished pleas coming out of the Philippines and to 
the administrationts misguided efforts in the Pacific. In the nation1s 
capital, the Washington Evening Star agreed that aid was needed in the 
Pacific, but only to Singapore, "the key," in its words, "of the entire 
Allied defense line in the Orient. 112 
On the other hand, the Concord Daily Monitor in the northeast 
saw the "retention of the Philippines as imperative. 11 Without help, it 
said, 11 the defenders were doomed. 11 3 Across the state line in Maine, 
the ~angor Daily News asked, "When are adequate operations to start 
in the Philippines? Time passes. Time presses and the critics do not 
have all the answers. 114 
On that same day, the Daily Oklahoman in the southwest re-
ported the first serious outpouring of discontent among the Amer ican 
"grass root11 folks . "The reverses in the Pacific, 
11 
it stated, "have 
130 December 1941, P• 1. 
329 December 1941, p. 4. 
225 December 1941, p. A-8. 
431 Dece1nber 1941, p. 8. 
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created a rising wave of congressional criticism against the adminis-
tration. 11 1 Several days later and further north, the Nebraska State 
Journal, an occasional supporter of the administration, placed the 
blame for the Philippine situation not on the administr ation but on 
Congress. "Cong r ess , 11 it said, "was to blame for not appropriating 
adequate and timely appropriations to fortify her Pacific possessions. 112 
The hope that Russia would enter the P acific War was also 
widespread among the American pr ess, the milita r y experts, and the 
commentators in ·w ashington. This idea was strongly advocated by 
MacArthur at this time b ecause it would h e lp r e lieve the Japane se 
pressure from the Philippines. 3 
The New York Times was one of the fi r st among the American 
press to suggest that Russia join the United States in the Pacific effort 
and stated that if she did not help, "then the policy of aid-to-Russia 
should b e discontinued. 114 The Arkansas Democrat called such hopes 
"wishful thinking, 11 and added that "Russia1 s entr ance would depend on 
Stalin, who was the best judge of when he should take that r isk. 115 The 
Los Angeles Times, in supporting this view, belittled the idea of look-
ing to others to fight our battle~. In a hard hitting editorial, it empha-
sized that 11it is useless and unworthy of us as a g r eat nation to stand 
13 1 D ecemb er 1941, p. 8. 2 3 January 1942, p. 6. 
3Morton, S trategy and Command: The First Two Years , p. 154 . 
4n December 1 941, p. 26. 5 15 December 1941 , p. 10 0 
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about hoping that the Russians or anyone else would defeat our declared 
enemy for us. 11 1 Yet in Februar y, the Amer ican pr esident would tell 
the t· na ion to forget about themselves and help defeat the declared enemy 
of others. 
On 29 December, the British-Russian position in the Far East 
was clarified by a joint statement issued on that day. The Concord 
~ily Monitor reported that after a strategy meeting held in Moscow, 
both nations decided to place the priority on the war against Hitler. 2 
The · · s1gn1ficance of this announcement to MacArthur was threefol d : 
First, it was a clear indication that Russia woul d not agree to attack-
ing Japan, the r eby dashing any American hope that she would intervene . 
Second, it reinforced the framework of the Allied Grand Strategy within 
Which the Allies worked until the end of the European War . And, finally, 
it indicated that the British would concentrate their major effort on the 
defense of Britain, Northern Africa, and the Near East. The Far 
East and the Philippines were to hold on as long as humanly possible. 
On 31 December, the Detroit Free Press reported that the 
White House, through the Chai rman of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
Senator Tom Connally (D-Tex. ), infor med the press "to be prepared 
for the loss of Manila. 113 It was a discouraging assessment of the 
Philippines' future and the administration ts way of preparing the 
11 January 1942, p . 2. 
229 December 1942, p . 4. 
331 December 1941, p. 11. 
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American people for its ultimate fall. This statement from the White 
House caused the American press and the nation to speculate on the 
ultimate fate of MacArthur. 
One of the most representative views of the press on this sub-
ject was expressed by the Des Moines Register: 11It would be foolish 
for an army to surrender one of its outstanding field commanders 
through any outmoded sense of personal chivalry of battle. 111 The 
Providence Journal scored the same point.., 
MacArthur should not b e a party to Custer1 s last stand. 
When the jig is up he should get out of Luzon for nothing 
would be gained in a street-to-street and house-to-house 
battle which could result in a senseless and profitless de-
struction. 2 
The New York Times, normally a supporter of Roosevelt, 
viewed the loss of Manila as an e rror in defense. It stated that the er-
ror was 11 no t of MacArthur and his men, but rather an e rror in the grand 
strategy emanating from Washington. 113 The Atlanta Constitution was 
also critical: 11Ame rica was caught unprepared to fight a war of the 
scope revealed by the Japanese offensive. 11 4 
On 2 January, Manilans were informed by the Manila Tribune 
that the Japanese were expected to enter the city on that day. They 
were urged to be calm and were told that the occupying force under 
international law had complete power of government and hence were to 
11 January 1942, p. 1. 
33 January 1942, p. 18. 
2 3 January 1942, p. 9. 
43 January 1942, p. 4. 
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be obeyedo 1 The fir st Japanese troops entered the city at 3:00 p. m. 
Manila time (1 :00 a. m. EST). For the first time in forty-three years 
since the American flag was first hoisted there at 5:43 p. m. on 13 
August 1898, "a foreign flag,'' remarked the Philadelphia Inquirer, 
"floated over Manila. 112 
While the capture of Manila was lamented in the United States, 
it was celebrated in Spain as a revenge for the "Infamy of 1898." The 
Newark Star-Ledger, in quoting the Spanish press, remarked that 
Japan had promised to return one-half of the Philippines to Spain for 
''her coming participation in the historic events which are going to change 
the face of the earth. 113 
Two of the most disturbing aspects of the Japanese successes 
in the Philippines to the American press and people were: One, the 
ability of a large naval force to suddenly appear on the horizon without 
interference from the Ame rican Navy; and, two, the inability of this 
same Navy to get aid to the Philippines. Since the whereabouts of the 
American Navy remained shrouded in mystery, the nation1s press 
speculated as to its whereabouts, and asked: "Where is the Fleet? 11 4 
The Navy was not the only one to feel the sting of criticism. 
The administration in Washington also got its shareo Compl aints b egan 
12 January 1942, p. 1. 
323 January 1942, p . 14. 
2 2 January 1942, p. 1. 
4 D aily Argus Leader, 29 D ecember 1941, Po 1. Also N ew 
York Times o 
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to pour into Congress from all over the country asking why reinforce-
ments had not been sent to Manila. 
Another constant critic of administration policies, the Wyoming 
State Tribune, in its editorial of 4 January, reported that the American 
people "wanted answers and action now. 11 This blast was followed on 9 
January with another shaft: 
Congress is seething with criticism of the Navy due to the 
negligence of the admirals and to the often repeated assertions 
by the sea-dogs that the slant-eyed yellow man could be defeated 
in a few months because of our navy1 s tremendous striking power. 
To the American press and public the administration1 s effort 
to send aid to MacArthur was grossly inadequate. Yet, what was being 
overlooked, remarked the Los Angeles Times, was that 11 the first bat-
tles of war had to be won on the production lines and in the shipyards 
inside the United States, by the American people themselves, 111 for 
total war knew no boundaries. 
120 December 1941, p. 4. 
CHAPTER IV 
INTO BATAAN 
The situation in the Philippines as the year ended was serious. 
In a year-end press release MacArthur stated: 
The enemy is driving in great force from both the north 
and south. His dive bombers practically control the roads 
from the air. The Japanese are using great quantities of 
tanks and armored units. Our lines are being pushed back.1 
In appraising the reasons for the American-Filipino withdrawal 
from the beaches without a sustained struggle, the Chicago Tribune 
attributed the failures to an inadequate trained for ce : 11 There were in-
sufficient trained troops to effectively man all the invasion points and 
to maintain and operate the more complex implements of war. 112 The 
Tribune also observed that the inability of the defenders to cover all 
possible invasion points revealed a glaring weakness in MacArthur 1s 
plan for the defense of the whole archipelago. Thus, under such limi-
tations, it pointed out, MacArthur could only offer token resistance. 
Another reason for the failure is that MacArthur placed too much faith 
in the ability of his Filipino troops to stop the Japanese while at the 
1GHQ, USAFFE~ Press Release, 31 December 1941, 
Willoughby and Prange, Campaigns of MacArthur, I, 16. 
22 7 December 1941, p. 8 . 
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same time underestimating the ability of his opponent. 
Although Homma1s troops were proceeding with comparable 
success on all sectors and pushing MacArthur1 s lines back, they were 
unable to make MacArthur stand and fight. The traditional battle that 
they had expected--the defense of the capital, which would have ended 
the main resistance- -did not materialize. The decisive battle was still 
to be fought. 
MacArthur 1 s first crucial test was the Calumpit bridge which 
spanned the swift flowing Pampanga River, and was located just south 
of San Fernando in Pampanga Province. A premature destruction or 
the capture of the bridge by the Japanese would trap most of the de-
fenders east of the Pampanga. To prevent this from happening, Mac-
Arthur ordered a strong defense to be made north of the bridge, 
around the Paridel-Baliung area, to stop any Japanese attempt to seize 
it. At about 0500 on 1 January, the last large Philippine unit, the 51 st 
Infantry, crossed the Pampanga. After waiting for an hour and fifteen 
minutes and making sure that all other American-Filipino units were 
safely across, Wainwright gave the orders to blow the bridge. 1 The 
blast was a signal to Homma that by not destroying the bridge in the 
initial stages of MacArthur 1 s withdrawal, he had committed a serious 
1Morton, Philippine s, 210; Willoughby and Prange, Campaigns 
of MacArthur, II, Part I, 102. Reflects that the Japanese 7th Tank 
R egiment captured and occupied the Calumpit bridges on 2 January and 
that Japanese troops then used them to cross the river. 
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and costly blunder. 1 
On that same day a press release from MacArthur1 s headquar-
tcrs stated: 
In order to prevent the enemy1 s infiltration from the east 
from separating the forces in southern Luzon from those in 
northern Luzon, the Southern Luzon Force for several days 
has been moving north and has now successfully completed 
junction with the Northern Luzon Force • • • • The entrance 
to Manila Bay is completely covered by our for ces and its 
use is thereby denied the enemy. 2 
Notwithstanding the optimism shown in the press release, MacArthur 1 s 
problems were far from being resolved. There still remained two 
more formidable barriers through which he had to funnel his troops. 
Any undue delay on the par t of the troops or a determined effort on the 
part of the enemy could spell disaster for the whole operation. 
The next c r itical point that the retreating troops had to with-
draw through was the town of San Fernando, located northwest of the 
Calumpit bridge. It is an important road and rail junction, strategically 
located about thirty-five miles northwest of Manila. San Fernando 
represented the key to MacArthur 1s blueprint and had to be held at all 
costs. The withdrawing forces from the north and the south united here 
and formed a consolidated line. 
1Two officers had requested that the bridge be destroyed but 
the 14th Army Air Officer's view was that the bridge was unimportant; 
consequently, it was left intact. The emphasis was put on bombing the 
retreating enemy. Morton, Philippines, p. 208. 
2GHQ, USAFFE, Press Release, 1 Jan 42. Quoted in 
Willoughby and Prange, Campaigns of MacArthur, I, 16. 
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Along a fifteen mile front which extended from Guagua on the 
east to Porac on the west, Wainwright positioned two of his best Philip-
pine Army units, the 11th and 21 st Divisions. One of the Japanese units 
opposing the defenders was the Tanaka Detaclunent under the command 
of Colonel Toru Tanaka. 
In the early morning hours of 5 January, the Tanaka force, 
attacking in bright moonlight, was decisively defeated in its repeated 
attempts to pierce the defenders' lines . The Indianapolis Star reported 
that 700 of the enemy were killed, and in assessing the victory stated: 
"It is encouraging, but it does not indicate that we are accomplishing 
anything more than delay. 111 The Dallas Morning News viewed it as a 
great victory for the defenders who 11 outmaneuvered and outfought their 
Japanese foe to get their first taste of victory and take a heavy toll 0£ 
Lhe enemy. 11 2 To the Providence Journal, it represented a moral vic-
tory and 11 although the defenders warded off the Japanese attacks they 
were forced to retreat. 113 On the whole, the Journal1s appraisal typi-
fied the feelings of the Ame rican press on the defenders ' victory. 
The iinal withdrawal of the defenders into Bataan had to be 
staged through the critical Loyac Junction and over the single-span 
Culo bridge. The success of this complicated maneuver depended on 
each unit maintaining a strict march discipline as well as a well-timed 
and coordinated schedule. It proved to be otherwise, for the withdrawal 
16 January 1942, p. 6. 
36 January 1942, p. 1. 
2 6 January 1942, p. 5. 
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bordered on mass confusion. Fortunately, it was made without harass-
ing enemy action. The 21st Field Artillery area was one of extreme 
confusion as infantry, tanks, and artillery pieces became intermingled. 
Colonel Richard C. Mallonee, senior instructor of the 21st, labeled 
the confusion 11 the first stages of an old fashioned southern political 
mass meeting and free barbecue. 111 By a single act of judgment, Homma, 
who had another golden opportunity to complete the battle of the Philip-
pines on schedule, contributed to his own failure. 
Nat Floyd, the New York Times correspondent, described the 
first week on Bataan as orderly confusion. "Trucks and buses ran in 
all directions night and day, loaded and empty, over the single lane 
gravel roads. 112 The sight of empty trucks rolling into Bataan was 
especially tragic, for each empty truck represented a lost opportunity 
to carry much needed supplies and rations into Bataan. 
In two short weeks, MacArthur had brought his forces under 
desperate circumstances and by two difficult maneuvers and two dif-
ferent routes safely into Bataan. Not one major unit was cut off or los t 
during this period. However, it should be noted that of the 43,000 Fili-
pinos that had started the withdrawal from the beaches only 28,000 
r e a c hed Bataan. The loss came largely from desertions. The Japanese 
1
Quoted from Mallonee Bataan Diary, 2 vols. I, 131. Copy in 
Office Chief of Military History; see Morton, Philippines, p. 224. 
222 April 1942 , pp. 1, 4. 
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casualties, in this same period, numbered about 4,500 men.I Mac-
Arthur1s military skill and strategy brought words of admiration and 
praise from the nation1 s press and from military experts from other 
nations. 
The Newark Star-Ledger commented that a Netherlands Indies 
military expert had characterized MacArthur 1 s decision to lay his bat-
tle line in Bataan as one of the "truly great pieces of strategy in this 
war and one which would have been shirked by most commanders. 11 2 
The San Francisco Chronicle remarked that among the British military 
experts there was a deep and frank admiration for MacArthur1s stand 
and for his successful withdrawal into Bataan. What they admired most, 
said the Chronicle, was his highly original and effective battle against 
the Japanese forces and getting his troops into Bataan with only slight 
losses. 3 
Even Tokyo did not hesitate to praise MacArthur1 s skill and 
admit that the Japanese were having difficulty in dislodging him. 
Tokyo1 s admission also summed up rather accurately the consensus of 
most military minds. 11Repeatedly tested by Japanese air and land at-
tacks, the line is still firmly rooted and his guns dominate most of his 
narrow front and Subic Bay. 114 Tokyo and Homma now knew that with 
1
Nuxnber given by former Japanese officers at General Homma1 s 
trial in 1946. For American figures, see Morton, Philippines, p. 230. 
2 5 February 1942, p. 2. 3 16 March 1942., p. 2.3. 
4Quoted in the Daily Oklahoman, 16 January 1942., p. 13. 
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MacArthur on Bataan victory would not come easily or cheaply. 1 Al-
though badly battered and tired of running, the defenders with morale 
high were more than willing to stand and fight. On 7 January, Mac-
Arthur informed Washington that he was on his main battle-line. 2 
Meantime, in the United States the P re sident called upon the 
American people to produce 60,000 planes, 45,000 tanks, and thousands 
of other needed equipment. In commenting on the speech the New Haven 
Journal-Courier declared: 11A fighting talk given in terms of the futur e . 11 3 
But it takes time to translate rhetoric and good intentions into positive 
action and time was what the defenders of Bat a an did not have. In 
retrospect, one of the American defenders, while a prisoner of war, 
stated: "With all the marvelous production figures we1ve seen its mighty 
little to cheer us up in here. 11 4 
Observing the failur e of Washington officials to t r anslate Roose-
velt1s elegant words into implements of war, the Bataan troops, according 
1For some very interesting comments of the Japanese com-
manders who opposed MacArthur, see Willoughby and Prange, Cam-
paigns of MacArthur, I, 16. The consensus was that it was a masterful 
strategic move and that the speed and efficiency of the operation caught 
them completely by surprise. 
2 This was the Abucay-Moran line (Map 3 J. 
3 7 January 1942, p. 1 7. 
4Quotation is fro1n one of several letters written by Major Carl 
Baehr, Jr. , while a prisoner of war in the Philippines. This letter 
dated 31 October 1944 was smuggled out of the prison camp and delivered 
to his mother in the U. So Maj or Baehr and 942 other prisoners of war 
died on 15 Dec 44 when the prison ship they were on was bombed and 
sunk in Subic Bay. Hereinafter cited as Baehr 1s Letters. 
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to the Chicago Daily News, began "A Bomber for Bataan Fund. 11 To 
spark the drive, the Bataan defenders adopted a slogan "Better any one 
bomber, than be buried on Bataan, 11 and even offered their pay for the 
purchase of a bomber. 11 l 
While his troops wer e digging in on Bataan, MacArthur , to 
tighten his defense and to gain greater effectiveness from his existing 
manpower and equipment, conducted a sweeping reorganization of his 
defense posture on Bataan. The peninsula was divided into east and 
west sectors and a Se rvice Command Area south of the Mariveles 
Mountains. The east sector was designated as I Corps and placed under 
the command of Wainwright, one of the most able commanders in the 
Far East. The west sector designated as II Corps was headed by 
Parker, and in command of the Ser vice Command was Brig. General 
Allan C. McBride. With these new changes and with his several lines 
of defense, MacArthur now had a well established defense in depth 
(Map 3) . 
On 10 January, MacArthur made an inspection tour of the bat-
tle position of his units along the main line of defense on Bataan. This 
was also the day chosen by Homma to have surrender messages dropped 
from the air behind the American lines. The messages warned M ac-
Arthur that if h e did not sur r ender, 11 our offensive will be continued 
with inexorable force. 11 2 The message went unanswered. After his 
tour oi inspection MacAr thur returned to his labyrinthine headquarters 
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in the Malinta Hill on Corregidor. It was from here that he directed 
the over -all operations of his defense. 
On thal same day a third major blow was struck at the Ameri-
can-Filipino cause when the Japa nese captured Olangapo, an important 
submarine b ase on the Bataan peninsula sixty miles from Manila. It 
was t he second key point in the defense of the Philippines. The Phila-
delphia Inquirer reported that it had been 11 captured without a struggl e . 111 
The loss was a tripl e blow to MacArthur. In the first place , it e limi-
nated the last effective port on Luzon through which American rein-
£or cements could enter Luzon; secondly, it became an impor tant base 
£or the Japanese through which they could pour men and supplies ; and, 
thirdly, it gave the Japanese command of Ft. Wint, Little Corregidor, 
which was captured on 12 Janua ry and shortly used by them as a for-
midable base to harass the de!enders 1 left flank. 
On 11 and 12 January, the Japanese made r epeated but unsuc-
cessful banzai attacks on the American-Filipino lines. Firing with un-
canny accur acy, the American a rtillery shattered each screaming wave 
as it char ged the strongly entr enched defenders. A few attackers suc-
ceeded in penetrating the defending lines, but on the following day they 
were flushed out of their concealments and destroyed one by one, very 
often in grisly hand-to-hand combat. 2 Gratifying as the victory was, 
it cost the Americans dearly. Whil e the J apanese could replace their 
casualties, the American-Filipino defenders could not. 
1 12 January 1942, pp. 1, 2. 2 Morton, Philippines , p. 270. 
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Although elated and paying tribute to the tactical genius of 
MacArthur, the majority of the American press cautioned against 
over-optimism and stressed that at best, this victory was only a de-
laying tactic. 1 On the other hand, the Minneapolis Star Journal, pre-
maturely optimistic, concluded that ' 'it is far too early to give up the 
Philippines as wholly lost. 112 
During the confusion of these early battles MacArthur, on 15 
January, issued a very controversial message : 
Help is on the way. Thousands of troops and hundreds 
of planes are being dispatched. The exact time of arrival is un-
known as they will have to fight their way through • 
• • • No further retreat is possible, our supplies are ample, 
and it is imperative to hold until aid has arrived. 3 
The message was intended to whip up the flagging spirits of the tired 
defenders. To the majority of the Filipinos it acted as an inspiration 
and aroused great enthusiasm, but when later corrected, "the depres-
sion was intensified. 114 
As the resistance on the Filipino home front stiffened, the 
Japanese, with a tendency at times to act impulsively, countered it 
with stronger punitive measures. The Philadelphia Inquirer related 
the story under two bold captions. The first stated: "Japs in Manila 
Copy German Hostage Order. 11 The second read: "Threatens 10 
1see the Washington Post, Cleveland Plain Dealer and New 
York Times of 14 January 1942, as well as many others. 
2 1s January 1942, p. 12. 
3MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 133. 
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Hostages for every Jap Soldier or Civilian Harmed. 111 In the south, 
the Miami Herald paralleled the last Tokyo action as one 11 From the 
Master 1s Book. 11 2 In the mid-west area, the Minneapolis Star Journal 
saw it as an admission th.at guerrillas were carrying out MacArthur1 s 
orders. 3 
The severity of the Japanese countermeasures was in sharp 
contrast to the favorable terms used in earlier leaflets when the Japa-
nese promised freedom from oppression. This turn-about r epresented 
to the St. Louis Post Dispatch an excellent indicator of how much suc-
cess the Japanese were enjoying in their efforts to wean the Filipino 
citizen from the Americans. 4 In a subsequent article, the Dispatch 
declared th.at 11 experiences through the centuries had taught the Fili-
pinos to meet the 11Nipponese benevolence with sharpened bolos. 115 
In looking to America for help, MacArthur and his American-
Filipino defenders were counting on the efficiency and the determination 
of the American worker and on America1 s vast industrial resources 
and mass production techniques to provide them with the striking power 
they so desperately needed to defeat the Japanese. The Times - Picayune 
of New Orleans remarked that just 11 one month1 s output of American 
planes would have made a big difference in dislodging the Japanese 
115 January 1942, p. 1. 
31s January 1942, p. 15. 
5Ibid. , p. 1. 
2 16 January 1942, p. 6. 
4 24 January 1942, p. l. 
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invaders. iil The Chicago Herald-American also scored the same 
point when it stated that "willingness to die was not enough." It went 
on to add that the defenders were not seeking or asking for relief from 
the rigors of war or from the constant strain and suffering of the 
gruelling daily battle. What they wanted, said the Herald-American, 
was "the equipment to enable them to make their efforts and their 
sacrifices successful. 11 2 But even these hopes were shattered, for on 
the day that MacArthur issued his controversial message the entire 
war effort of the United States was condemned. 
On 15 January, Senator Harry S. Truman (D-Mo. ), head of a 
Senate Investigating Committee, denounced the war effort of the 
Administration, the Navy, the Army, dollar-a-year men, big business, 
lobbyists, labor, and about every defense office and agency in and out 
of Washington for the lag in war production. The report implied that 
the whole war effort to date was a miserable failure; in short, a com-
plete mess. The press saw in the report a damning indictment against 
the administration and a reason why supplies were not getting to Mac-
Arthur. 
In a strongly worded editorial, the Arkansas Democrat called 
attention to the repeated charges that had been made against our lead-
ers and others in our 1941 effort. It then went on to say: "If ineffi-
ciency, outright stupidity, could be classed as a felony, our jails 
would be populated with 1big shots 1 in and out of the armed services, 
1 1 March 1942, p. 2. 2 2 April 1942, p. 1. 
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as well as in the seats of the mighty of both business and labor. 11 1 
In relating the administration1s failure to MacArthur 1 s pre-
dicament the D enver Post stated: "This report shows why the Japanese 
had superiority ever since they started the war in the Pacific, and it 
shows why MacArthur has been seriously handicapped in his heroic de-
fense of the Philippines. 11 2 Both editorials typified the reaction of the 
press to the Truman report. The critical appraisal made by the news-
papers of the Truman disclosure succeeded in stirring up a hornet1 s 
nest throughout the country. 
As if one controversy were not enough, the Salt Lake Tribune 
added fue l to a second when its war analyst, Constantine Brown, a 
consistent supporter of MacArthur,. stated: 11 The first concern of the 
United States is the Pacific, not the Atlantic. It seems strange that 
while we think in grandiose terms of striking Hitler , we are sacrific-
ing American-Filipino troops in Luzon without attempting to send them 
help. 11 3 Brown 1s report reviewing the needs of both theaters was criti-
cal of America1 s delay in starting a Pacific offensive. Since Japan 
proved stronger than expected, he suggested a major allied operation 
in th e Pacific to be followed later by a European effort. This was one 
idea that a "Europe First '' oriented administration would not accept. 
MacArthur always believed that the "Europe First" concept 
adopted by Washington and London was a blind and disastrous one. He 
116 January 1942, p. 4. 
3 18 January 1942, p. 20B. 
2 15 January 1942, p. 2 . 
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in turn sought the broadest possible strategy that would keep our posi-
tion strong in Asia.l He never became reconciled to its credo nor to 
the people who worshipped at its shrine. To him, "Washingt.on1 s every 
application 0£ that strategy was taken as a vindicative personal thrust. 112 
Roosevelt, the co-author of the allied global strategy, was 
strongly opposed to an all-out American effort in the Pacific,. Without 
examining all strategical and tactical implications, he believed that 11A 
defeat of Germany means the defeat of Japan, probably without firing a 
shot or losing a life. 11 3 Being about 10,000 miles away, official Wash-
ington could make these decisions with detachment. 
By mid-winter of 1942 some editors began to question the logic 
of sending the American Navy ac ross the Pacific and through enemy 
controlled waters to the Philippines. Yet most of them had no illusion 
that sooner or later a g reater emphasis would have to be placed on the 
Pacific conflict and an extensive effort made there to halt the Japanese 
juggernaut be£ore it was too late. The American public and Congress, 
however, more susceptible to the emotional outcries from Bataan, per-
sisted in their demands that every effort be made to send aid to Mac-
Arthur and his defenders. One out of three letters to Congress, reported 
1Albert C. Wedemeyer, W edemeyer Reports, (New York: 
Holt, 1958), p. 206. 
2Albcrt R. Buchanan, The U.S. and W. W.11, (New York: 
Harper-Row Inc ., 1946), p . 218. 
3Matloff, Strategic Planning, pp. 2 72- 73. 
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the Wyoming State Tribune, asked: 11Why don1t we send aid to Mac-
Arthur? 111 
Those of the nation1 s press cautioning against any rash action 
to send the Navy out into enemy controlled waters tried to impress on 
their readers why there was no simple solution to this complex prob-
lem. The Providence Journal noted that because of the distances in-
volved, two ships would be required for every one in the Atlantic, and 
we did not have that many ships. 2 The Newark Star-Ledger stressed 
the need of air power to protect the fleet, for without such a cover the 
fleet was in mortal danger. 3 The Wheeling News-Register cautioned 
that the desire for revenge was not enough and in recapping the fuel 
requirement for a battle force, the Register commented on its need to 
refuelo 4 The Arkansas Democrat agreed with the Register, remarking 
that it would require several refuelings and added "our lack of refueling 
bases is no secret. 11 5 The Dallas Morning News suggested to its read-
ers to go to the maps for a better understanding of the importance of 
the Japanese strategic positions in the Pacific. The reason for this 
change of attitude was that many editors were convinced that naval ves-
sels within reach of land based air power were in mortal danger. To 
127Januaryl942, p. 4. 
36 January 1942, p. 10. 
2 31 December 1941, p. 11. 
4 11 January 1942, p. 4o 
57 February 1942, p. Four II. 
range of a battle force equalled, at this 
(Map 1) . 
The maximum operational 
time, 2, 500 to 3,000 miles 
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these editors, air power, because of its great flexibility of use, une-
qualed mobility, and terrific destructive power, had a quality all its 
own that could not be matched by any other weapon of war .1 
Yet, there still remained a few editors who were convinced 
that aid had to be sent to the Philippines regardless of the cost. The 
Richmond Times-Dispatch was of the opinion that the Navy should col-
lect ships and give battle to the Japanese. To this paper, victory was 
not the issue. If the Americans won, the Japanese threat would be 
eliminated and their armies isolated. If the Japanese won, the conti-
nental United States could not be blockaded and the consequence of such 
a defeat would not be vital. 2 
The clamor for aid to MacArthur was further enhanced on 28 
January when banner headlines informed the American public that 11An 
American Expeditionary Force 11 had landed in Ireland. The Bismarck 
Tribune asked: 'Why are we sending troops to the British Islands where 
they are not needed rather than to the Far East where they are needed 
and the fighting is? 113 It also urged the people to express their disap-
proval of our leaders• war efforts to date. The Denver Post questioned 
a policy which produced " all kinds of long range planning, but a sicken-
ing lack of immediate fighting," and one which allowed needed reinforce-
ments to go to Europe "while only congratulations were sent to our 
1 The fear of air power was due to Japan1 s spectacular suc-
cesses with its air force in the Pacific. 
2 3 January 1942, p. 2. 3 19 February 1942, p. 4 . 
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Pacific t· h I ig ter s who are in dire straits. 11 
Several other newspapers saw the shipment of troops to Ire-
land 
as a move to give Winston Churchill, England's Prime Minister 
and co-a th 
u or of the "Europe First11 concept, moral support in strenth-
ening h· . . 2 
is political position in Great Britain. While the Indianapolis 
Star · . 
---..;;. in its editorial of 28 January questioned the allied logic in "pack-
ing the B .. 
rit1sh island with soldiers, 11 the Philadelphia Inquirer, in turn, 
issued 
a strong condemnation of the basic strategy followed by Wash-
ington and Lond on. In an editorial which stressed that "our primary 
fi h . 
g ting is in the Pacific, 11 the Inquirer denounced the Washington 
st
rategy as being nothing more than a device 11aimed at covering rat-
holes here , there, and everywhere, rather than assume the initiative 
a
nd 
smash the rats themselves. 11 Then in a cutting slash at Great 
Brita· . 111 it added: "While England had crisis on top of crisis elsewhere, it 
kept from 2,500,000 to 3,000,000 men at home as a protection against 
invasion. 113 
Five days earlier, on 23 January, the Japanese began a series 
of land· h f 1ngs behind the defenders I lines on the s out west coast o Bataan 
in the · · . 4 d I t f th 1 d · V1c1n1ty of Mariveles. The third an as o e an 1ngs was 
1 
29 January 1942, p. 8. 
2B N ark Star Journal, among many. _ ur ling ton Free Press, ~~e_:w:.::;::..:.::..;:;..-----~ 
3 
6 February 1942, p. 12. 
0 
k 4Known as the Battle of the Points. 
s awa )Tan, Quinauan, and Anyasan. 
They took place at Long-
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made on the night of 1-2 February. A mixed United States force of 
army, navy, marines, and air force troops was quickly assembled and 
placed under the command of Brigadier General Clyde A. Shelleck. 
Although the defenders could not prevent the landings, they did succeed 
in containing the invaders and finally destroying all remnants by 15 
February. Assisting the defenders were the big guns from Corregidor 
whose 6 70 pound shells str uck terror in the hearts of the Japanese 
troops unfortunate enough to be in the impact area. The American 
press reported several of these local skirmishes as major victori es. 
The Philadelphia Inquirer was not alone among the nation1 s 
press in reporting a premature victory on 3 February under the cap-
tion, "Another Brilliant Victory for MacArthur. 111 In the mid-west, 
the Chicago Daily News reported the local engagements under the 
heading, "Crush Mighty Attack in Bataan. 112 Further west, the 
Lawrence Daily Journal reported, "Tributes to Captives, 11 and then 
added: "The enemy although employing its best trained shock troops 
had been mastered and destroyed. 11 3 
Although the nation1s newspapers were prematur e in their 
victory claims, the headlines did pay deserving tributes to the defend-
ers who neither asked nor gave quarters, and whose failure would have 
resulted in a complete collapse of the Bataan defense as early as the 
first week of February. In three weeks of fighting, where success was 
13 February 1942, p . 2. 
32 February 1942, p . 1. 
2 3 February 1942, p. 1. 
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very often measured in feet and yards, the defenders succeeded in de-
stroying about 900 Japanese at a cost to themselves of "70 killed and 
100 wounded.
111 
It was a small price to pay in view of the possible con-
sequences if the invasion had succeeded. 
Even as the fight for the southwest coast was taking place, an 
equally desperate b attle was being fought behind the main battle line 
f or the control of several important road junctions. 2 Involved were 
1, O 00 Japanese troops of the 20th Infantry. When the battle ended on 
17 February the Japanese had lost approximately 625 men. They had 
breached the mainline of defense at one point but were never able to 
capitalize fully on their temporary success. A strong counterattack by 
the defenders had pinched off the enemy and pocketed them until they 
coul d be destroyed in detail. 
One of the most dramatic stories to come out of this epic in-
volve d the fierce Igorots of North Luzon. The Philadelphia Inquirer in 
its leader for a page one story reported the Igorots as 11Riding to Instant 
D eath Atop Tanks. 11 They clung to 11 the jolting turrets, ••• screamed 
blood chilling battle cries and held the line against fierce Japanese as-
saults. 11 In telling the story to newsmen, MacArthur was quoted as say-
ing, 11 G entl emen, when you tell this story stand in tribute to the gallant 
Igorots. 113 
1Morton, Philippines, p. 324. 
2
For a detailed account see Morton, Philippines, pp. 325-346. 
323 February 1942, p . 1. 
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The New York Times was closer to the truth when it reported 
that the tanks would have been lost and useless in the jungle maze with-
out the Igorots. In riding on top of the tanks, the fearless Igorots acted 
as the eyes of the tankers and helped guide them by use of sticks. In 
quoting the Times, Morton expressed the opinion that the Japanese had 
already started to withdraw to their own lines after failing to capture 
the important road junctions. 1 
In analyzing the brilliant defense of Bataan, the Cleveland 
Plain Dealer while giving due credit to M acArthur also put in a plug 
for 11 the Filipino fighting man who contributed much of the heart and 
brawn" for the campaign. 2 When Wainwright was asked to express his 
opinion of the Filipino troops, he stated: 11 These troops are toughening 
into real soldiers; with 40,000 trained men e ithe r American or Filipino, 
we would chase t he Japanese into the sea. 11 3 
The excessive losses suffered by the Japanese from both opera-
tions and their failure to make any appreciable gains on Bataan finally 
forced Homma to pull back his troops and request reinforcements from 
Tokyo. 4 It was this decision which brought a comparative lull over 
Bataan that lasted through most of March. It was also during this lull 
that one of the wildest rumors of the Pacific conflict developed. Homma 
1Morton, Philippines, p. 346. 231 January 1942, p. 2. 
3New York Times, 10 February 1942, p. 4. 
414th Army losses b etween 9 January and 8 February were 
6984. Willoughby and Prange, Campaigns of MacArthur, II, Part I, 108. 
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was reported to have committed suicide because of his failure to defeat 
MacArthur. These repeated failures, reported the majority of the 
press, drove Homma to commit hari kiri in MacArthurrs penthouse 
apartment. 1 It was just another myth to be added to MacArthur 1 s grow-
ing collection and made him loom even greater in the eyes of the F ili-
pinos. The story was never retracted and Homma lived to be tried as 
a war criminal in 1946. Homma1s replacement was reported to be the 
11Conqueror of Singapore, 11 Lieutenant General Tomoyuki Yamashita. 
On 14 February, in a radio speech to the American people 
President Roosevelt suggested that they think in terms of all peoples 
and continents, not countries. This speech touched off a new round of 
criticism from the press. In the west, the Denver Post expressed the 
most representative view: 
This is a beautiful and unselfish statement; unfortunately, 
this is not a beautiful world. If the American people do not 
think First, Last, and All the time in terms of the U. s. who 
else is going to look out for our interests. 
We better take a leaf from ChurchilFs book, he thinks 
solely in terms of what is best for England. Instead of divid-
ing our forces between two wars and making no appreciable 
progress in either of them, let us concentrate on our own war. 2 
The St. Louis Post Dispatch agreed that the people had a right 
to be impatient and no longer satisfied with the answers that were com-
ing from Washington b ecause ''many of the shallow answers proved mis-
leading or downright untrue. The bedlam of confusion, incompetence 
1S ee the N ewark Star-Ledger, 10 March 1942, p. 10 for 
example . 
2 16 February 1942, p. 2. 
General Douglas MacArthur 
-Lieut. Gen. Masaharu Homma 
A:iumdatcd Pre:tl' 
7 6 
Source: Associa ted Press releasese 
• < ,  
Lit'11I. Gen. Tomoyuki ) ama;;; hitn 
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and waste at Washington, 11 the paper remarked, 11reechoes throughout 
the world. 11 I 
In supporting the public 1s right to dissent even in war time, 
the Washington Post in the nationts capital stated: 
The public is clamoring for more sea and air action and 
for reinforcements for MacArthur and are not acting purely 
from emotional basis . Such demands have their roots in Ameri-
can offensive tradition. The public can hardly be blamed for 
being bewildered and indignant that there is no evidence of our 
living up to tradition. 2 
The amount of criticism against the President1 s p olicy on this one is sue 
was a clear indication that neither the nation nor a majority of the press 
were r eady to accept a strategy just because the President wanted it. 
On 2 3 February an indignant President returned to the nation's 
radio networks to blast his critics and denounce enemy propagandists, 
rumor mongers, and poison peddlers .3 He implie d that so1ne rein-
.forcements had been sent to MacArthur. The President denied that 
the raid on P earl Harbor was responsible for the situation in the Philip-
pines . He indicated that even if an attack had not b een made, the send-
ing of the fleet through thousands of miles of enemy inve sted water s 
would have been a hopeless operation. The President, however, did 
not indicate how the fleet would have been used if it had not been at-
tacked, but his stand on the 11Europe First11 polic y would not make the 
answer difficult to £ind. Actually, his statement was a c ontradiction 
1 18 February 1942 , pp. lC, 3C. 220 February 1942, p . 8 . 
3New York Times, 24 February 1942, pp. 1, 4. 
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of the Pacific war plans. 1 
The President1 s speech was given headline space by most 
newspapers. The New York Times, a constant supporter of the Presi-
dent1s policies, headlined the speech across eight columns in bold black 
capitalized letters but sandwiched in between two similarly printed 
headlines reflecting the war news of the day: 
SUBMARINES SHELL CALIFORNIA OIL PLANT: 
ROOSEVELT SEES ALLIES ON THE OFFENSIVE: 
JAPANESE BALI INVASION FLEET SMASHED2 
In its editorial of the same day the Times referred to the President as 
a " citizen of the world" and added that 11 the U.S. was fortunate to have 
such an experienced leader. 11 In the Times, Roosevelt found one of his 
few gratifying supporters which often urged its readers to give the 
President and his administration1 s war policies full support. 
Over the din of the a rguments for and against the administra-
tion1s strategy there now began to emerge a stronger demand to save 
MacArthur by getting him out of the Philippines. Commented the Wyo-
ming State Tribune: "The public is amazed, disillusioned and alarmed 
by the ineptness, muddl ing incompetency in the nation1 s war machine. 11 
In suggesting that MacArthur be placed in supreme command of the 
armed force it added : 11Americans will have reason to hope that skill, 
1Inherent in all war plans for the Pacific was the policy that 
the U. S. Navy would attempt to keep the communication lines open to 
the Philippines, and convoy reinforcements and supplies to the islands 
at the first opportunity. 
224 February l 942, pp. 1, 4. 
1 l ,,. 
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not bungling and confusion, will direct their efforts. 11 l 
In concurring with the Wyoming State Tribune 1s recommenda-
tion, the Washington Post suggested that MacArthur and his men be 
rescued and deployed to other areas where they could be of great help 
to the Allies. Then it went on to say that 11 a large share of the r esponsi-
bility for our disappointing perforinance rested with the Army and 
Navy. 112 The Albuquerque Journal was of the opinion that the decision 
to leave the Philippines should not be left to the General, because Mac-
Arthur, involved in a life and death struggle on Bataan, had no way of 
knowing the full facts, so the burden of deciding should be left to Wash-
ington. 3 
115Februaryl942, p. 4. 
321 February 1942, p. 1. 
220 February 1942, p. 8. 
CHAPTER V 
CHANGE OF COMMAND 
Orders to Australia 
MacAr thur 1 s over-all defensive position on Bataan, including 
the bay forts, never seemed more favorable than it was at the middle 
of February. The battles of the points had been won, the pockets 
c l eared, and a frustrated enemy forced to retreat and lick his wounds. 
An uneasy lull had descended over the battlefield. Yet to the military 
experts and strategists in Washington, it was clear that despite the 
heroism and gallantry of the American-Filipino troops the Japanese 
could not be denied the final victory. This was also obvious to Mac-
Arthur who reported to Washington that unless help was forthcoming, 
"there is no denying the fact that we are near done. 111 
Any hope in the Philippines that the basic Washington-London 
strategy might change was quickly dispelled on 1 March when the Presi-
dent informed the nation that the Pacific war as a whole would have to 
be fought and won by a process of attrition against the Japanese. Noth-
ing, the President implied, not even the fall of Singapore nor the loss 
of Ame rican lives and possessions in the Pacific would induce him to 
1Morton, Philippines, p. 354. 
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r evis e his basic strategy. 1 
Fortunately, the Filipino1 s loyalty to America remained 
strong and resistance against the Japanese continued widespread within 
all levels of Filipino society. President Quezon urged the Filipinos to 
have faith in their soldiers in the field and above all "to trust America 
and our beloved leader--President Roosevelt. 112 This sentiment may 
have been an undeserved confidence. 
The extent of their unrest and response to the pleas of their 
President was underscored several days late r when the Japanese, fear-
ing a popular revolt, ordered the surrender of bolos, farm tools, and 
other weapons. This action may have been 1notivated, said the Miami 
Herald, by the Moros r pledge ''to help the United States drive the Japa-
nese out of the Philippines. 11 3 Ten thousand Moros had sworn on the 
Koran to fight as one people and to never lay down their swords until 
the Japanese were ejected. 
When MacArthur was informed of this mass manifestation of 
faith he responded with poetic effusion to suit the occasion: 
No more inspiring or significant incident has occurred in 
the mighty struggles that now engulf the world than the magnifi-
cent stand they have taken. It covers them with immortal 
g lory and elevates them to the highest pinnacle of spiritual 
1s ee for example, San Francisco Chronicle, 1 March 1942, p. 1. 
for an excellent consensus of the nation1 s press. 
2Miami Herald, 2 March 1942, p. 1. 
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grandeur. 1 
The nation's press attributed such actions and the gallant stand 
made by the Filipino troops to MacArthur's ability to instill in the Fili-
pino his own fiery spirit. It was, the press remarked, a response in 
kind for the faith and confidence that h e had in the Filipinos, particularly 
in his native troops. Although deprived of essential training, his 1 1two 
for a nickel 11 Filipino troops had become a match for the more combat 
hardened Japanese. 
The Wyoming S tate Tribune was quick to observe in MacArthur1 s 
conduct of the war tangible advantages that extended far beyond the bat-
tlefield, particularly in the field of human r elationships. In contrast-
ing his feat with that of the United States in this area, the paper had 
this to say: 
The brave general1 s operation in the field of propaganda 
is more important to the democratic nations than is generally 
realized. So long as he can k eep alive the spirit of revolt and 
resistance among the vanquished peoples, it will be difficult 
for the inva ders to cash in fully on their victories. 2 
In contrasting the fee lings of the Filipinos for both MacArthur 
and Roosevelt the St. Louis Post noted that while they respected 
Roosevelt as a forceful leader, their feeling for M acArthur was rever-
ential. They believed in the impregnability of the MacArthur line and 
clung to the view that 11 the man has not b een born who can defeat 
1This story made headlines in most papers reviewed. See, 
among others, the New York Times, Cleveland Plain Deal er 1 3 M arch 
1942. 
2 11 March 1942, p. 4. 
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MacArthur, 11 l particularly a Japanese . This latter point became a 
fixation in the minds of many allied leaders and peoples in the Pacific 
and in the United States. 
Nor were the Filipinos alone in their high regard for Mac-
Arthur. The Dutch, reported the Detroit Free Press, "are clamoring 
for MacArthur 1 s withdrawal from Luzon to head the Pacific Allies. 112 
The Washington Post strongly recommended that both MacArthur and 
his fighting men, Americans and Filipinos alike, be rescued and de-
ployed to other areas where they could be of great help to theA.llies. 3 
Another strong MacArthur supporter was the Nashville Banner 
which strongly urged that MacArthur be made the new Allied Chief in 
the Pacific. The Banner remarked that the Australians looked upon 
MacArthur 11as an individual with the qualifications and qualities needed 
to make a man acceptable to their country, 11 and one who was 11 a terror 
to the Japanese and a pick- me-up to the morale of the free wor ld. 11 4 
In Honolulu the feeling also existed the M acArthu r was the 
logical choice for supreme commander in the Pacific. The Honolulu 
Star-Bulletin stated: 11All cheering indicates the man to lead ••• an 
offensive against the Japanese and be gener alissimo is MacArthur . 11 
The Star-Bulletin believed that MacArthur1 s leadership would succeed 
in rallying all the productive genius and ability of the United States to 
1st. Louis Post Dispatch, 3 April 1942, p. 18. 
2 1s February 1 942, p. 3C. 320 February 1942, p. 8. 
4 2 March 1942, p. 1. 
84 
supply ships, planes, men, and munitions. MacArthur was expected 
to fire the "imagination and enthusiasm of his fellow citizen and inspire 
the worker to step faster, work harder and labor a little longer for a 
man who had their confidence and admiration. 111 The strong demand 
£or MacArthur to lead the Pacific effort was a good indication of how 
deeply he had captured the public1 s imagination at home and abroad. 
As the Japanese invade r penetrated further and further south, 
a great fear and uneasiness began to grip the Pacific Allies, particu-
larly during the first week of March when Java was about to fall. A 
sobering and critical analysis of the prevailing conditions by the press 
disclosed a pessimistic view about any relief for Bataan. 2 Such pessi-
mism was based on the fact that the Philippines were completely sur-
rounded by Japanese forces and that not a single base within 2 , 000 
miles of the Philippines was occupied by allied forces. 
This feeling of pessimism and the apprehension over the fate 
of Java reached deep into the jungles of Bataan and was shared by the 
American-Filipino defenders. The feeling among the troops, remarked 
Major Baehr, was that 11the outcome in Java would have a strong im-
pact on our own fa te . Everyone is watching what1s going on Java way. 113 
Despite this pessimism, the Philippines remained the onl y beacon still 
17 March 1942, p. 8. 
2
Among many, Newark Star Ledger, 10 March 1942, p. 10. 
3Baehr1 s Letters, 6 March 1942. 
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shining bright and cle ar out of the turbulent Southwest Pacific. In a sea 
of despair it had become a symbol of tenacity, resourcefulness, and 
heroism. 
After reviewing the pros and cons of MacArthur leaving the 
Philippines, some American newspapers thought that the men them-
selves were convinced that he should move elsewhere--most likely 
Australia--from where he could start a new offensive and lead his men 
to victory. I 
MacArthur 1s evacuation from Luzon was an overriding issue 
not only to the leaders and peoples of the southwest Pacific but also to 
the leaders in Washington. Unknown to the nation1 s press was the fact 
that action had already been taken at the highest Washington level to 
transfer MacArthur out of the Philippines. The decision, based on mili-
tary requirements and not on public opinion, was made by President 
Roosevelt on 22 February when he ordered MacArthur to proceed to 
Australia. 
When MacArthur received the presidential order he requested 
and received permission to remain at his post until he felt the time was 
ripe for his departure. He believed that a sudden departure on his part 
would prove harmful to the American cause in the Philippines . But on 
12 March, MacArthur thought the time had arrived for his departure 
and gave up his command on Luzon to General Wainwright who would 
1Newark Star Ledger, 10 March 1942, p. 10. 
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be left to close 
out the final phase of a gallant but futile defense. I 
Before MacArthur left the Philippines, his estimate of the 
situatio I . 
n ed hun to reorganize the command structure of USAFFE and 
to deveI 0 P plans for future tactical operations on Bataan. The forces 
in the Ph"li . 1 PPliles were divided into four commands : the Visayan Force 
lv!indan F 
ao orce, Harbor Defense Force, and the Luzon Force. 2 The 
Proposed changes would not be implemented until after MacArthur1 s 
departure from the Philippines. The most important aspect of Mac-
.Arthurl 
s command change was the retention of the over-all command 
of the Ph·1· 1 lppines forces in his own hands. He intended to maintain his 
control 
over the forces in the Philippines through a deputy chief, Briga-
dier G 
eneral Lewis C. Beebe, who would remain on Corregidor and act 
as his 
representative. This arrangement made Wainwright, a senior 
Officer 
, a subordinate to MacArthurts representative on Corregidor. 
MacArthurts strategy for the Philippines envisaged first, " a 
fight to the finish"; second, "an attempt to open a supply line from the 
southern portion of the Philippines"; and third, "to conduct a counter-
attack to capture the enemy base at Subic Bay. 113 MacArthur was 
s. 1 On 9 March, MacArthur briefed Wainwright on the over-all 
i~!Uation. The order of battle that he left with Wainwright rule.cl out any 
th a of surrender except on the field of battle. It was to be a fight to 
e end. 
2.M A th , for this change was to prevent the com-I ac r ur s reason 
P etc surre d f 11 ds by any one headquarters in the Philip-p· n er o a comman 
llles. 
3w Campaigns of MacArthur, I, 20, 21. 




convinced that if the defenders held out long enough America would send 
in supplies and reinforcements. He was completely opposed under any 
circumstances or conditions to the ultimate capitulation of the Philip-
pine forces. If the Philippine command had to be destroyed, it would 
have to be on the battle field after destroying as many of the enemy as 
possible.l 
When General Marshall in Washington was informed of Mac-
Arthur1 s action he received permission from the President to revoke 
the orders because of their undesirable effect on Wainwright and on the 
morale of the command. The President sent a message to MacArthur 
which left no doubts that Washington wanted Wainwright to assume full 
command of the Philippine forces. 2 MacArthur voiced no objection to 
the President1s request. While the President1s and Marshall1s decision 
had merit, it proved unsound, for no consideration was given to the 
unique military situation in the Philippines. Its consequences at a later 
date were to prove tragic for the defenders on Bataan. MacArthur1 s 
plan to continue the defense effort with a hard core of guerrilla fighters 
had been compromised. 
Mindanao, for all practical purposes, was closer to Australia 
than it was to Bataan. The southern islands of the Visgayen-Mindanao 
group were also out of the mainstream of the Philippine battle and added 
nothing to the defense of Luzon or Bataan. Nor were Bataan and 
1rbid., pp. 20-2 1. 
2Radio, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 810, 22 Mar 42; quoted 
in Morton, Philippines, 365. See pp. 364-65 for other messages. 
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Corregidor, both involved in a life and death struggle, in any position 
to provide even minimal aid to the forces outside its immediate area. 
But Marshall, preoccupied as he was with global problems of 
greater magnitude, could not be expected to analyze at this time either 
the local situation or the desirability of a divided command in the event 
of a defeat even though it had been expected by official Washington and 
was now overdue. 
In failing to present his plans to Washington for consideration, 
MacArthur showed a lack of judgment and erred seriously. His uni-
lateral action was contrary to established War Department policies. 
As a former Army Chief of Staff, MacArthur was aware of this and 
should have informed Marshall of his plans before he left Corregidor 
for Australia, not after he arrived in Australia. 
Nothing could have been more stimulating and pleasing to the 
American press and the nation than the news that MacArthur and a small 
staff were in Australia and of his appointment as the United Nations 
Commander for the Southwest Pacific Area. MacArthur viewed his suc-
cessful flight through the Japanese blockade as a vindication of his firm 
conviction that the Japanese blockade could be breached. 
Though justified in the early phase of the conflict when the situa-
tion was still fluid and called for strong determination and an adventur-
ous spirit, these convictions were now less than valid. To asswne that 
conditions in March were just as favorable: irrespective of his success-
ful breakthrough, was to ignore reality. MacArthuris success with 
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several torpedo boats was not a true test of the effectiveness of the 
Japanese b l ockade. A s l ow and hard to maneuver freighter with a high 
silhouette is a poor substitute for a fast and highly maneuverable tor-
pedo boat to break through a naval blockade. 
MacArthur 1s flight from Corregidor had started on 11 March, 
and included in his group of twenty-one people wer e his wife, his son, 
and his son1 s Chinese nurse. The many stories and myths which devel-
oped around this episode also embellished the MacArthur legend. For 
example, he was reported to have loaded the PT boats with all kinds of 
personal belongings. In view of the limited space and the number of 
people in his party, MacArthur limited himself and his family to the 
same weight as other members of his party. The group1 arrived in 
Mindanao on 14 March and was escorted to Del Monte air£ield2 where 
MacArthur expected to find three planes. 
Waiting on the air strip was only one of the three B-171 s that 
MacArthur had expected. According to MacArthur the plane was so 
operationally deficient that he rejected any idea of using it to carry 
passengers. He was so incensed at the affront that he radioed General 
Marshall in Washington for the best three planes in the United States 
or Hawaii, with complete and adequate crews. 11 To attempt such a 
1For a complete list see Morton, Philippines, p. 359. The 
officers and crews of the four PT boats were granted Silver Stars. 
2MacArthur and his group were met by Major General William 
Sharp, the commander of the Mindanao force. 
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desperate and important trip with inadequate equipment, 11 he said, 
11would consign the whole party to death. rr l 
When the planes finally arrived the group took off for Australia 
on a flight which the N ew York Times incorrectly described as " soar-
ing over 2, 000 miles of the hottest fighting a:reas in the Southwest Pa-
cific. 112 The Boston Globe called the flight from Luzon II seven days of 
death defying travel. 11 3 
In commenting on MacArthur 1s breakthrough, several of the 
nation1 s newspapers passed judgment on the effectiveness of the Japa-
nese blockade. The San Francisco Chronicle was of the opinion that 
the Japanes e hold of the Philippines was slight: 11All Japan has been 
able to hold are ports and portions of the periphery of the principal 
islands. S e venty-five per cent of the Philippines is still held by the 
American-Filipino troops. 114 Clarke Lee, an Associate d Press war 
c orrespondent writing for the Miami Herald, reported that he had 
"trave led hundred of miles over water and by car without sighting a 
single plane, warship, or soldier. 115 Howeve r , the majority of the 
na t i ,rn 1s press, caught up in the drama of MacArthur 1s arrival in 
Australia, paid little attention to these remarks. 
MacArthur 1 s transfer to Australia met with the unanimous 
1Radio, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 482, 14 Mar 42, WDCSA 
370. 05. Quoted in Morton, Philippines, p. 360. 
2 18Marchl942, pp. I, 5. 
4 19 March 1942, p. 1. 
3 19 March 1942, p. 1. 
S3 April 1942, p. 2. 
,, 
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approval of almost all of Lhe nation ts press. Virtually every paper re-
garded MacArthur
1 s appointment as suprem d h. h e cornman er as a 1g 
tribute to one of the most outstanding soldi·er s · .1.t h' t Hi' 5 1n m1 1 ary 1s ory. 
dramatic dash through enemy lines, his safe arrival in Australia, and 
his appointment as United Nations Commander of the Southwest Pacific 
Arca became one of the greate5t human-interest stories of World War 
II. Ii was in the press p a rlance, a 11 Big 11 story, and it filled the head-
lines of the nation1s press for several days. 
When MacArthur and his party landed in Australia on 17 March 
he was greeted by countless Australians, and before boarding a train at 
Adelaide, he told the cheering throng : 
The President of the United States ordered me to break 
through the Japanese lines •••• for the purpose, as I under-
stand it, of organizing the American offensive against the Japa-
nese. A primary purpose is the relief of the Philippines. 
And Lhcn he added the three words that were directed to the defenders 
in the foxholes of Bataan, to the troops, sailors, and nurses on Corregi-
dor, and to the millions of Filipinos-- 111 shall return. 111 
These words had an enormous impact on the peoples 0£ the free 
world everywhere and stirred their imagination because of its message 
01 hope. IL was a pledge to the Filipino people in their hour of darkness 
that Lhe enemy would be driven from their shores. It b ecame a symbol 
and batlle cry for the guerrilla movement and the Filipino fighting man. 
IL was etched 011 walls, in the beach sands, and in tre streets of Lhe 
lsee, among many others, the New York Times, 21 March 1942. 
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towns and the cities of the islands. It reminded the Japanese of what the 
future held for them. The words could not be forgotten for they were 
propagandized and perpetuated by Colonel Carlos Romulo, the news-
caster for Corregidor 1s "Voice of Freedom." 
While the emotional, black capitalized headlines of the Ameri-
can press screamed out the electrifying news of MacArthur1s break-
through from the Philippines, the more subdued editorials attempted to 
interpret the significance of his arrival in Australia. The Burlington 
Free Press believed that MacArthur was risking his military reputation 
on a tremendous gamble. It pointed out that the big gamble was whether 
troops and e quipment would reach him fast enough. 
The Nebraska State Journal lauded MacArthur and thought his 
transfer would give the war in the Pacific a shot in the arm: 
The gallant general, the best the United States has put 
into the field, has been moved from a hopeless trap in Bataan. 
More than that, it will give the Allied cause in the South Pacific 
a stimulus that few other single developments could have 
given. 1 
The -wheeling News-Register asked the public to give Mac-
Arthur a chance. Irrespective of his extraordinary stand against the 
Japanese, this paper did not expect him to reverse the tragic events of 
the past and put the enemy to rout immediately. In order to accomplish 
this feat, the News-Register emphasized, he would need men, ships, 
planes, and equipment, and that the people who were predicting that 
MacArthur would carry the fight to the Japanes e were 11 only expressing 




a hope. 11 l This paper thought that the choice of MacArthur as supreme 
commander would have a stabilizing and unifying effect on the American 
people because in their hearts he would be the last man they would let 
down. 
The Arkansas D emocrat knew of no other move that could have 
been made which would have met with more universal approval. Not 
only was he greatly esteemed in England and Australia, but nowhere 
was 11 he more admired as a true fighting man than in his own country. 11 
The Democrat saw the transfer as contributing 11 to the morale of all na-
tions fighting the Axis partners. 11 As a warning to the Japanese com-
manders on Bataan, this paper advised them not to get too complacent 
and cocky and think that the Filipino would fold up. 11General Wain-
wright is a pretty tough hombre himself and knows the Philippines al-
most as well as MacArthur. 112 
According to the Los Angeles Times, perfection has its own 
reward and 11 the reward of outstanding performance in a tough assign-
ment is frequently a tougher one. 11 Then it went on to say that there 
was no question that MacArthur was capable of doing a good job. The 
Times did see a danger in expecting the new chief to perform miracles, 
and miracles, it pointed out, can only be performed with the ingredients 
of war--men, ships, guns, tanks, planes, and appropriations • . 11 The 
best way to show our gratitude to MacArthur, 11 it remarked, 11is to back 
1 18Marchl942, p. 4. 2 18 March 1942, p. 6. 
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him all the way. 111 
The Des Moines Register thought MacArthur was successful 
in the Philippines 11because he knew when to withdraw and where to 
withdraw, and he did not permit the enemy to dictate when and where 
he should finally stand. 112 In scoring this same point the Newark Star-
Ledger stated: 11MacArthur at heart is an apostle of the offensive, not 
the defensive. He does not believe in leaving the initiative to the foe, 
tactically or strategically. 11 3 
Seve ral other newspapers cautioned the American people 
against over-optimism and the danger of falling once again into a com-
placent attitude now that MacArthur was at the helm. The New Haven 
Journal-Courier advised its readers not to expect immediate and spec-
tacular results, and it reminded them that "the distances are too great 
and with MacArthur in Australia the lines from the American produc-
tion lines are even longer. 114 It called MacArthur rs transfer a needed 
tonic and saw in the transfer new policies and a more determined effort 
to resist the enemy. 
The Oregon Statesman, on the other hand, still had doubts 
about the sincerity of the administration1 s motives and questioned if the 
nation1 s leaders, military and political, were fully committed to defeat-
ing the Japanese and driving the enemy back to his home waters. 
l 18 March 1942, p. 4. 
3 18 March 1942, p. 14. 
2 18Marchl942, p. 4. 
4 19 March 1942, p. 10. 
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Although the Statesman heaped high p r aise on MacAr thur and called him 
the 11Man of the Hour, '' the " United Nations1 Hero, 11 and the 11Strategist, 111 
it did not consider him a miracle worker but rather a military genius 
who had the capacity to do the job provided he got the tools. And on 
this subject it pointed out that 11we must see to it that the tools are sup-
plied quicklyo 11 2 
The New York Times said the reaction in Washington, when 
they heard the news, was one of sheer joy and jubilation as the senators 
and representatives enthusiastically hailed the change. Congress inter-
preted the President1 s deci s.i on as a p lan to preserve MacArthur 2s 
talents for the fut.ire conduct of the war. The Times declared that 11by 
sheer force of his personality, General MacArthur has knit together 
into a fighting team a heterogeneous collection of troops in the Philip-
pines. 113 
In an attempt to bring the American public down to earth, the 
Detroit Free Press asked them not to fo r get the beleaguered forces on 
Bataan who were still experiencing the tortures of hell. 11 War can never 
be won merely by gigantic planning nor by an outlay of tremendous 
funds. 11 4 The A lbuquerque Journal, in scoring this same fact, pointed 
out that neither could it be won by a forty-hour week. It had to be won 
by aggressive action, and the Journal reminded the American workers 
l 19 March 1942, p. 4o 
3 18 March 1942, p. 22. 
2Ibido 
4 19Marchl942, p. 3. 
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that 11 the men on Bataan are on the job twenty-four hours a day. 11 Then 
it asked this question: 11 When are we going to make some sacrifices to 
back them up and hasten the day that help will r each them? •il 
Not all editors approved of MacArthur 1s departure from the 
Philippines. In California, Robert Noble and Ellis Q. Jones were ar-
rested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for slurs made against 
MacArthur in their publication,. Friend of Progress: 
The great Gibraltar-like General M acArthur who valiantly 
fired on the Bonus Army in Washington •••• the great protector 
•••. he just ran out in the dead of night and didn1t tell nobody 
nothing. Even the British general down in Singapore had the guts 
to stay on the job and surrender in the interest of his troops when 
he saw the jig was up. General MacArthur 1s desertion of his 
troops in the field is probably the smallest and cheapest Dunkirk 
of a long series. 2 
While speaking to an audience on 25 March, Noble referred to Mac-
Arthur as a 11 phony11 who looked too much like a general to be a general 
and then added: 111 say to hell with MacArthur. 11 His audience of 300 
cheered. 3 
Even Tokyo tried to propagandiz.e MacArthur1 s flight to Aus-
tralia but without success. It interpreted his departure as an indica-
tion of the low morale among American-Filipino troops and as a da1naging 
confession that the American-Filipino leaders 11were not worth their rank 
and that MacArthur 1 s choice to lead the floundering Allies was clear 
121 March 1942, p. 1 .. 
2 Los Angeles Times, 1 April 1942, p. 1. Also the New York 
Times. 
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evidence of the low morale of the Allied forces. 111 On 26 March, 
Tokyo ridiculed MacArthur 1s method of 11 Ballyhoo" and use of the press 
to get what he needed: 
The general appears to have exhausted his fertile imagina-
tion after doing a marvelous job of building himself up as a 
Hollywoodian hero in the Bataan campaign. 
Though MacArthur was able to conjure up colossal tales 
of heroism at Bataan, where there was no one around to check 
up on their validity, America1s number one hero has apparently 
co1ne to the realization that the situation in Australia demands 
something more than self ballyhoo. 2 
Once the question of commander was resolved by Washington, 
Wainwright assumed full command of the American-Filipino forces. 
The new commander was a 1906 graduate of West Point, a veteran of 
World War I, and, like most good military leaders, he was courageous 
and fearless . His staff work in the First World War won for him the 
Distinguished Service Cross. Because of his tall and lean figure he 
was known as "Skinny. 1 1 
Most newspapers were of the opinion that Wainwright was more 
than qualified to be MacArthur1 s successor and lead the American-
Filipino forces. However, the Washington Post had some reservations 
and believed that he "lacked the canny knowledge of Filipino psychology. 113 
In paying tribute to both men the Nevada State Journal antici-
pated no change in tactics because of the change of commanders. Ne ither 
1Manila Tribune, 20 March 1942, p. I. 
2Manila Tribune, 26 March 1942, p. 4. 
33 April 1942, p. 11. 
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did it underestimate Wainwright1 s role: "If he can get the breaks, he 
can come out of Bataan a hero. The eye s of t he world are upon him as 
upon MacArthur . 11 l Afte r MacArthur1 s departure from Corregidor 
there was a lack of day-to-day news on the Philippines. M ost newspa-
per men who had been on Corregidor o r Bataan followed their hero to 
Australia, where he once again became the center of attention in his 
new role as United Nations Commander of the Southwest P acific Area. 
Wainwright, with a deter iorating militar y situation and with a 
force of sick and hungry men, remained to c lose out the final and un-
happy episode of the American defense of the Philippines. 







BEYOND HUMAN ENDURANCE 
The full depth of MacArthur's defense of the Philippines can 
not be fully evaluated or truly understood, nor can Wainwright1 s posi-
tion be fully appreciated without a discussion of Bataanfs logistic dif-
ficulties. Unfortunately for America's cause in the Philippines, the 
military logisticians, strategists, and experts in Washington lacked 
the ingenuity and flexibility of mind to solve the difficulties inherent in 
long lines of communication (Map 1). 
The men on Bataan were starving and they knew it. The inade-
quate and improper diet since the middle of January was taking its toll 
in sickness and in the lost hope for relief. The loss from sickness 
proved more damaging to American-Filipino strength and morale than 
the casualties sustained in actual combat since 8 December 1941. 
Yet some would not give up hope . The Filipinos viewed Mac-
Arthur as the greatest leader living and saw in his trip to Australia a 
ray of hope and a guarantee that help would soon arrive. This belief 
was reinforced by the G eneral's first public statement from Australia 
that "the relief of the Philippines was his primary purpose and that he 
had received orders from the President to take the offensive. 111 Still 
lBeloit Daily News, 27 March 1942, p. 1. 
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some thought that he had deserted them. This feeling was expressed 
in several forms, the most favorite being poetry. 
One of the Navy1 s most slurring terms "Dugout Doug, 11 was 
made into a poem and became a favorite on Bataan. It was sung to the 
tune of II The Battle Hymn of the Republic. 11 
Dugout Doug1 s not timid, he 1 s just cautious, not afraid, 
He ts protecting carefully the stars that Franklin made. 
Four star generals are as rare as good food on Bataan. 
And his troops go starving on. 
Dugout Doug is ready in his Chris-Craft for the flee 
Over bounding billows and the wildly raging sea. 
For the Japs are pounding on the gates of Bataan. 
And his troops go starving on.1 
It was a ''catchy" tune and provided some moments of relaxation. How-
ever, MacArthurts personal record in the face of danger and his readi-
ness to shed his own blood for his country made it no more than a 
11 catchy11 tune. The St. Louis Post Dispatch interpreted the term as 
"sour grapes" and saw it as an effort on the part of naval personnel to 
r etaliate for MacArthur 1 s bitterness and pointed accusations against 
the Navy and the admirals in general for running out on him. 2 
By the end of March all but the hard core optimists on Bataan 
had lost all faith in the possibility of timely r e lief. By then, food and 
the hope of survival from one day to the next became the most important 
facts of life. On this score, the Los Angeles Times caustically remarked: 
1Toland, But Not in Shame, p. 305. 
226 January 1942, p . 9A. 
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It was difficult for the men to understand why aid did not 
come. They felt that help could have been sent and that 
American forces could have fought their way to Bataan. 
Whatever the reasons, the looked-for, prayed-for help did 
not come.l 
The New York Times reported that the defenders became so 
sensitive to any sign of relief that when several vessels were shifted 
from the south side of Corregidor to the north side to escape shell fire, 
the observers on Bataan imn:i.ediately spread the rumor that a relief 
convoy had arrived. When the truth was revealed, many still refused 
to believe it. The paper added that 11although three airfields had b een 
built on Bataan for expected planes, none came. 11 2 
As the days passed and no relief ships arrived, the truth be-
came self-evident. The men on Bataan continued to scan the seas and 
fight, and as they scanned and fought they also composed more poetry 
and proclaimed it loudly: 
We 1re the battling bastards of Bataan: 
No momma, no poppa, no Uncle Sam, 
No aunts, no uncles, no nephews, no nieces, 
No rifles, no guns or artillery pieces, 
And nobody gives a damn. 3 
A soldier-poet expressed the mood of the men when he wrote: 
••• MacArthur 1s promise in every mind. 
The time is secret but I can say 
That swift relief ships are on the way 
Thousands of men and hundreds of planes 
Back in Manila before the rains! 
·with decorations and honors too. 
122 March 1942 , p. 1. 2 12 April 1942, p. 36. 
3Toland, But Not in Shame, p. 292 . 
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MacArthur said it, it must be true.I 
A poignant example of the apprehension and the force and effect 
of rumors on the Bataan defenders was expressed by one of the Ameri-
can defenders there. 
The main and most pre<;ious source of misinformation 
is of course rumors. The trouble is that people want so badly to 
believe the1n, and no matter how hard we try rumors just will 
crop up and spread ••.• 
And then he added: 111 guess we1re all suspicious of most news now, 
just because of the effect that rumors have had. 112 In a later letter dated 
31 October 1944, smuggled out of a Manila war prison, the writer had 
this to add to his former statements about rumors. 
It1 s a littl e short of amazing how reports can become 
garbled and information misquoted even when its available. 
And we are, all of us through sad experience, tempted to 
believe the worse news, because it seems that is the kind 
that most often turns out. 3 
In the over-all logistical situation, the food problem on Bataan 
was considered by far to have been the worse spectacle of the whole 
Philippine epic. It was far from ideal. MacArthur1 s decision to fight 
the invader on the beaches diverted supplies that normally would have 
been sent to Bataan on the outbreak of war. Unfortunately, a large 
a1nount of these supplies never reached Bataan even though a frenzied 
last minute attempt was made to stock Bataan and Corregidor. 
1The quotation is from a poem entitled "Abucay Withdrawal11 
by Henry G. Lee. Quoted by Morton, Philippines, p. 387. 
2 Baehr 1 s Letters, 10 February 1942. 




The confusion surrounding the evacuation of rations and sup-
plie s to B a taan can be attributed, first and foremost, to timing. Mac-
Arthur1s refusal to d r op his own p lan and revert to WP0- 3 until 23 
D e c ember made last minute preparation and orderly evacuation of all 
necessary supplies to Bataan virtually impossible. The second major 
reason why more rations were not transported to Bataan was because 
of the speed of the withdrawal which compelled many unit commanders 
to disregard orde rs from USAFFE. Unit commanders on their way to 
B a taan were instructed t o pick up extra rations and supplies and de-
live r them to the receiving depots on Bataan. 
The failure of many unit commanders, mor e conce rned about 
the safety of their own units, to follow these simple instructions con-
tributed in a large m e asure to the serious food shortage which followed. 
Units that did pick up extra rations made no effort to turn them in. The 
third main r e ason for the food shortage on Bataan was because of an 
inadequate transportation system and the misuse of available transpor-
tation. I 
Whe n word reached MacArthur 1 s headquarters that no extra 
rations had been r eceived by the depots, an immediate investigation 
w as started. The inve stigation brought to light some minor infractions 
of the ration regulations and some s e rious abuses in the requisitioning 
of rations. 
1s ee in particular Theodoro A . Agoncillo, The Fateful Years, -----------=-J a pan 1 s Adve nture in the Philippines, 1941-45, 2 vols. (Quezon City: 




An important fac t or in the heavy demands on the limited food 
supply was the large influx of refugees into Bataan during the with-
drawal from the beaches. The status of these refugees was question-
able, yet there is no record of positive action being taken to clear 
them and all othe r nonessential Filipino civilians from Bataan. 
By the middle of January, fresh provisions almost disappeared 
and bananas and fruits wer e no longer on the menu. In early February 
the rice stock ran low. Rice is the basic food for the Filipinos and 
when bread was substituted, it often proved unpalatable to them. In 
addition, when the bread was received by the frontline troops it was 
often 11as hard as rocks. 111 The situation was somewhat improved when 
several small supply ships with loads of rice, beef, and sugar success-
fully ran the Japanese blockade. When the flour supply was exhausted 
in late March, rice was substituted and servings were limited. As 
food became scarcer, the troops were fed only two meals a day. Several 
ships succeeded in landing supplies on the southern islands, 2 but of the 
10, 500 tons unloaded only 1,100 tons r eached Bataan or Corregidor. 
The Honolulu Star Bulletin reported that herds of cattle were 
driven into Bataan prior to the arrival of the troops and 11this saved the 
1 Personal Interview, Roberto Martir es, 11 August 196 7. 
2 The se were the Coast Farmer, which arrived in Mindanao 
on 19 February 1942, and the Dona Nati and Anhui which arrived at 
Cebu in mid-M arch. S ee Morton, Strategy and Command: The First 
Two Years, p. 191. 
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troops for a while from the acute shortage of meat. ril The Nevada 
State Journal remarked that Lieutenant Colonel Warren Clear, who had 
been on Corregidor, observed that 11 as early as 5 February, the men 
were reduced to eating rice and mule meat and their own pack animals. 2 
The Miami Herald expanded on this point when it commented that the 
"troops occasionally bagged wild pigs and carabao, but these were few 
and far between, 113 and even monkeys and iguanas became scarce. 
Even Wainwright1 s favorite horse and prize jumper, Joseph Conrad, 
was sacrificed to feed the hungry men. 4 
On 3 April the Louisville Banner reported that the Secretary 
of War, Henry L. Stimson, had stated at a press conference that 11 for 
every ship that a rrived in the Philippines, we lost nearly two ships. 11 
Two of the administrationts greatest critics, the Herald American 
and the Chicago Tribune, did not let the opportunity go by without tak-
ing a full broadside at Mr. Stimson and the administration. 
Two days before Mr. Stimson1 s statement, the Chicago Herald 
American had commented that the mistrust of the American public in 
its leaders was rising to such proportions that Congress was in a 
11 sweat" about the amount of mail it was getting from discontented 
voters over the progress and direction of the war. It then said this 
1 1 7 March 1942, p. 4. 
3 13 April 1942, p. 1. 
2 13 April 1 942, p. 1. 
4 Toland, But Not in Shame, p. 291. 
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about the situation: 
One of the heaviest floods of protest from the people in 
congressional history is pouring into Washington. The in-
formation from some Congressmen reveals that 1they are 
nearly breaking up1 under the strain of this vast deluge of 
letters and telegrams. 1 
On the following day, the Herald blasted the administration 
again: "It is an astounding thing that everyone seems to be able to get 
out of the Philippines, but nobody seems able to get in. Everyone from 
the highest to the lowest implore that aid be sent to them swiftly. 11 2 
Several days later it shafted the President by asking: Is the President 
for the first time since his first inaugural in 1933 out of touch with 
public sentiment? Has he failed to read the signs right? In answer-
ing these questions, it caustically stated: 
Some members of his party who think so, have stated that 
Mr. Roosevelt--the master politician--has no conception, as 
yet of the depth of the feelings which are agitating the people 
over the conduct of the war. The revolt against the President 
and his war policies is said to be more pronounced in the south 
than in any other section of the country, and Congress indicates 
it is true. 3 
The Chicago Tribune, never convinced that the administration 
was doing its utmost to aid MacArthur, zeroed in on Mr. Stimson and 
held him responsible for the failure to get ships through to the Philip-
pines. " Furthermore, 11 commented the Tribune, 11Mr. Stimson did 
not say whether three or thirty ships made the attempt. 11 4 Undoubtedly, 
it was thinking of the eighty percent loss suffered by the Allies 1 convoys 
11 April 1942, p. 14. 
34 April 1942, p. 12. 
22 April 1942, p. 1. 
4 11 April 1942 1 p. 1. 
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sailing war material to Russiats northern ports.l These ships, often 
in greater danger than many sailing the Pacific, were constant prey for 
the German 11 U 11 boats roaming the Atlantic and for the German land-
based planes which often harassed them clear into their port of call. 
Furthermore, continued the Chicago Tribune, Patrick Hurley, our 
minister to New Zealand, who was sent out to the war zone to help 
expedite supplies to Bataan, ''did not arrive in Wellington until 12 
March 1942, more than three months after war began. 11 2 
The Concord Daily Monitor made the startling disclosure that 
when Mr. Hurley arrived in the Pacific, 11 he was well heeled with Ft. 
Knox gold. 11 3 The official explanation for this unusual procedure was 
that the captains, the crews, and the ship owners who were willing to 
make an effort at breaching the Japanese blockade would not accept 
anything but gold; even American dollars were not good enough. It was 
a dangerous mission. Each ship would have to go in on an individual 
basis because 11there were no convoys to run in vital loads of foods 
and drugs for the now cornered American-Filipino forces. 114 
The lack of food was not the only commodity which plagued 
the men on Bataan. Cigarettes wer e perpetually in short supply and 
seriously affected the morale of the troops. According to Frank 
1whitney, MacArthur, His Rendezvous with History, p. 34. 
2 11 April 1942, p. 1. 3 7 May 1942, p. 4. 
4Allison Ind, Allied Intelligence Bureau, {New York: Van 
Re s s Press , 1 9 5 9) , p. 116. 
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Hewlett~ Miami Herald correspondent, the extreme shortage of ciga-
rettes along the firing line had raised the black market p r ice to five 
pesos 1 per pack in contrast to the low price of ten centavos in the r ear 
area. On the firing line even a cigarette puff was a luxury at ten cen-
tavos a puff. 2 
Another serious problem, and one never fully resolved, was 
the c ritical shortage of clothing and equipment. The Philippine Army, 
never adequately equipped, had reached Bataan in an exhausted and un-
shod condition. It lacked even the minimum essentials to withstand the 
jungle fighting and the extremes in temperature of hot days and cold 
nights. Replacement clothing was obtained by stripping the dead. Even 
the dying were often denuded as they gasped their last breath. 3 
To the problem of climate, health,and malnutrition was added 
the dread disease of malaria. Bataan was consider ed one of the world's 
worst malaria infested areas. Its natives lived under the most primi-
tive sanitary conditions and often fell prey to the ravages of malaria. 
The native villages were breeding grounds for the mosquito. Com-
manders adopted a limited control program which failed because of 
conditions in the villages and because of the attitudes which the native 
tr oops carried over into military life. The call of nature was answered 
1Miami Herald, 18 April 1942, p. 2. One peso is equivalent 
to fifty cents in U. S. currency; one centavo is equal to one half cent. 




wherever it was most convenient. 1 
As long as there was an adequate supply of quinine and each 
man took his prescribed dosage of 5 grams, malaria could be controlled. 
But the supply was never adequate to meet demands. 2, The lack of qui-
nine and the unsanitary practices followed by the troops added to the 
frightful toll of malaria victims. The stream of casualties of all types 
grew so rapidly that it clogged the field and base hospitals and brought 
about a complete collapse of medical evacuation procedure. Forward 
medical stations broke down completely and the conditions at the two 
general hospitals were no more favorable. 
Nat Floyd, war correspondent for the New York Times who 
had spent 106 days on Bataan, reported that in the last days of the 
Bataan campaign as many as eighty per cent of the troops were suffer-
ing from malaria, thirty per cent had bacillary dysentery, ten per cent 
suffered with amoebic dysentery, and many more had hookworms. By 
then, Wainwright and his commanders estimated that combat efficiency 
had been reduced to about twenty per cent of normal. 3 
Concerned about the seriousness of the situation on Bataan, 
Wainwright on 26 March sent a radio message to Marshall in Washing-
ton, stating that the food situation on Bataan had reached desperate 
straits and that food on hand would only last until 15 April. The troops, 
he warned Washington, were at one third rations, poorly balanced and 
1Ibid. 2Morton, Philippines, pp. 378-79. 
3Morton, Philippines, p. 384. 
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very deficient in vitamins, and "if the supplies did not arrive by 15 
April, the troops there will be starved into submission. 11 1 
Although the Philippines were part of MacArthur•s Southwest 
Pacific Command, Wainwright had author ity to deal directly with 
Washington. When MacArthur read a copy of the message, he sent one 
of his own. "It is of course possible, " he stated, " that with my depar-
ture the vigor of application of conservation may have been relaxed. 11 2 
Major Baehr, as he thought about his last full meal, stated: "It must 
be grand to be a well fed soldier on the winning side of a war. We 
1 Battling Bastards of Bataan' have never had that view- .. its been short 
rations and tighten your belt all along. 11 3 
On 23 March, the Sto Louis Post Dispatch reported that the 
Japanese had intensified their propaganda appeal s to Wainwright1s 
troops. They urged the defenders to surrender and they presented 
G eneral Wainwright with an ultimatum which demanded his surrender 
by 22 March or else he would have to face the consequences 0 All prop-
aganda appeals were ignored. In reporting the latest Japanese propa-
ganda effort to MacArthur Wainwright informed him that "he would 
keep fighting. 11 4 
1 Toland, But Not in Shame, p. 305. 
2Willoughby and Prange, Campaigns of MacArthur, for Mac-
Arthur1s " Order of Battle" before leaving the Philippines, I , 20, 21. 
3Baehr 1s Letters, 12 October 1944. 
423 March 1942, p. 24. 
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The Japanese plan for the final and decisive showdown called 
for sustained attacks against Bataan and Corregidor alternately until 
28 March when the main attack would be switched back to Bataan. After 
this date Corregidor woul d be harassed by periodic bombing on a twenty-
four hour basis. The New York Times reported an "increased number 
of troop movements and patrol c lashes on Bataan," and two days of 
sustained bombing attacks "from early morning until midnight11 against 
Corrcgidor on 26 and 27 March. 1 
As the intensity of air and military attacks increased, Bataan 
became a virtual hell. Facing no opposition and showing contempt for 
the anti-aircraft guns on Bataan, the Japanese pilots waited until the 
last minute to drop their bombs. Forced to keep under cove1· or close 
to their foxholes, the effectiveness of the defenders and their will to 
fight were materially reduced. 
On 2 April, General Yamashita publicly announced the start 
of a large scale effort which would end in victory. Yamashita 11 was 
determined to wear the defenders down by sheer weight of numbers and 
machines. 112 Oddly enough, the day chosen to start the main offensive 
was an important day for each side. For the Christians it was a reli-
gious holiday--Good Friday, and for the Japanese it was a national 
holiday in honor of Japan1 s first ruler, the legendary Emperor Jimmu 
Tenno. 
128 March 1942, p. 1. 






On 6 April, a concerted effort by the defenders to regain their 
lost positions failed. The drive was ground under the heels of a mas-
sive push developed by the Japanese 4th Division and 65th Brigade 
which steam-rolled through the abortive push. H was a decisive vic-
tory for the Japanese. 11 The remorseless grinding power of the Japa-
nese hordes, 11 said the Philadelphia Inquirer , 11 is beginning to win 
more ground than the battle-weary American-Filipino soldiers and the 
smoke-staine d United States Marine s and sailors are able to retake . 111 
In a subsequent edition it had this to say: 11 The whole picture 
is one of maximum effor t on the part of every element of Wainwright1 s 
command--maximum effort against overwhelming opposition which has 
now developed irresistible momentum. 11 2 The Dallas Morning N ews, 
in commenting on Bataan and Corregidor, stated: 11 They should be held 
at all costs in any way possible for it constitutes the only island of re-
sistance in a sea of Japanese domination. 113 In describing the drama 
of the events, the Chicago Daily News commented: 11 Clawing their way 
further into the stubbornly defended positions of the defenders, they 
forced them slowly but unquestionabl y back. 11 4 T he Nashville Banner 
reported that the seriousness of the situation and the heavy fighting 
which approached 11 toe-to-toe intensity was radioed to Washington and 
MacArthur 1 s headquarters in Australia. 11 5 
l7 April 1942, pp. 1 , 2. 
3 8 April 1942, Part II, p. 2. 
58 April 1942, p. 1. 
2 9Aprill942, pp. 1, 2. 




The Japanese forces maintained pressure all the way down to 
the toe of Bataan. In Manila Bay, their artillery bearing barges, al-
though inaccurate, were causing harassment and destruction to the de-
fenders and their beach defenses. To compound the seriousness of the 
situation, the Japanese had installed some heavy artillery in strategic 
positions on Wainwright1s right flank. The destruction caused by these 
big guns, which were able to sweep the whole field of battle with concen-
trated fire, was both extensive and demoralizing to the defenders and 
to their positions. 
The constant bombing and artillery shelling forced the de-
fenders to stay in their foxholes and left them in a bewildered and de-
moralized state. The ravages of hunger and disease had so deteriorated 
the fighting quality of the defenders that under the strain of the bombing 
and artillery barrages some of them began to crack, making them im-
pervious to the orders of their superiors. 
In pondering why Yamashita was in such a hurry to win the 
Philippines and be willing to pay a disproportionate high price in men 
and equipment, the Los Angeles Times concluded that it was due to 
several reasons: First, Japan1s urgent need to consolidate gains and 
release troops for other military objectives; second, the unconquered 
islands of the Philippines represented a £ace-losing reproach to J apa-
nese strategy and power; third, the danger of Corregidor in American 




possibility of a relief force r eaching Wainwright. l 
In editorializing on the desperate situation in the Philippines 
the Providence Journal stated: 
..• It might be thought that this situation leaves General 
Wainwright no choice but to surrender. It is supposed to be 
folly to resist the inevitable. Surrender is not dishonorable in 
such circumstances. Indeed surrender to avoid a sacrifice of 
life would seem to add the virtues of common sense and humani-
tarian impulses to those of bravery and fighting skill already 
magnificently displayed. 2 
The Journal interpreted the savagery of the Japanese latest attacks as 
an effort to compensate for the inferiority complex acquired from pre-
vious Bataan setbacks. 
By the morning of 8 April, the smell of death was everywhere. 
Somber shadows had begun to enshroud the drama of Bataan. The r e-
morseless g rinding power of the Japanese forced the defenders to take 
whatever defensive positions or cover that were available. It resulted 
in the first breakdown of organization and command within the defender st 
ranks. 
The situation on Bataan became one of complete confusion as 
the Japanese drive developed irresistible momentum. Shifting their 
attacks alternately from the bay forts to Bataan and then back again to 
the bay forts, the Japanese heavy bombers blasted the communication 
J.ines between the two in an effort to shut of£ the supplies flowing from 
Corregidor. In an effort to stem the tide Wainwright called for a 
counterattack on the evening of 8 April. Commented the Idaho Daily 
1 9 April 1942, Part II 1 p . 4. 2 9 April 1942, p. 13. 
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Statesman: 11It never had a chance. Its failure was due to the physical 
and mental exhaustion of the troops who did not have the strength to 
leave their foxholes. 111 It was an indication, said the Statesman, that 
effective military resistance on Bataan had just about ceased to exist. 
At this point, General Edward P. King, the Bataan commander, 
finding the situation hopeless and to avoid further loss of life, decided 
on his own volition to surrender his forces. Neither he nor his staff 
saw any way to stop the Japanese from taking the high ground north of 
Mariveles by the evening of the next day--9 April. 2 After a final meet-
ing with his officers, during which instructions were issued for the de-
molition of all military stores except vehicles, King sent a terminal 
message to Wainwright: 
••• I have decided to surrender Bataan • • • • This 
decision is solely my own. Neither my staff nor my command 
has helped me. If I do not surrender, Bataan will be known as 
the greatest slaughter in history. 3 
Millions of dollars of explosives were destroyed. The result-
ing explosions caused violent tre1nors in the demolition areas and gave 
the spectators on Bataan and Corregidor an unrivaled display of fire-
works. It was all the Fourth of July celebrations rolled into one. The 
e xtravaganza was described by the correspondent of the Chicago Tri-
bune who witnessed the scene from Corregidor 11as a scene of tremen-
dous explosions and of myriad of colored fires as munition dumps 
l 10 April 1942, p. 2. 




exploded and men carried out the last defiant orders of the scorched 
earth policy. 11 1 
Shell fragments were falling so fast and in such profusion that 
the defenders were forced to seek shelter in their trenches and fox-
holes. Even as the defenders carried out the last defiant orders, 
Nature, not to be outdone, added her own touch to Bataan1s final hours. 
In the late evening of 8 April, a severe earthquake shook the peninsula. 2 
The story of King1 s surrender is one of confusion and mi sun-
der standing between the Japanese and the Americans. 3 His efforts to 
gain consideration for his men proved futile. A formal surrender 
treaty was never signed and the Japanese refused to accept the surren-
der as one of an integral fighting force. The results were disastrous. 
The surrender of Bataan proved an anticlimax to the tragic 
consequences that soon followed. The story of Bataan ended on a note 
of horror and atrocities as the defenders were compelled to undergo a 
sixty-five mile "Death March" from Mariveles to San Fernando. De-
prived of adequate food and water and the vehicles that King had saved 
from destruction, the troops were forced to march under a hot sun. 
Stragglers were clubbed, beaten, and bayoneted by their guards. It 
was under such degrading conditions that King and his vanquished 
111 April 1 942, p. 1. 
2 Toland, But Not in Shame, p. 329. 
3Nakayama, Negotiations with King, 26 August 49. A TIS 
Document 50246. Quoted in Morton, Philippines, p. 465. 
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warriors made their way into captivity.I 
Although these conditions were the norm rather than the excep-
tion, many other prisoners received fair and humane treatment. There 
has developed a controversy as to whether the inhumane treatment ex-
tended to the vanquished was carriecll out with or without official sane-
tion. The main point of the controversy centers on the "Order To Kill 
Captives. 112 This order is purported to be an official announcement 
condoning death for the prisoners. 
The order is strongly disputed by Stanley Falk, author of 
Bataan: The March of Death. 3 But Brigadier General Clifford Blue-
mel, presently retired and former Commanding General, 31st Division 
(PA), who has lived through the "Death March11 confirms its validity. 4 
The document was never introduced in evidence at General Homma1 s 
trial in 1946 and this fact may tend to reduce its validity and legality. 
However, there appears to be no question, as substantiated by the 
events surrounding the surrender, the march itself, and from wit-
nes sed accounts, that the spirit of the order, whether directed from 
higher headquarters or not, was carried out by a large number of the 
Japanese captors and in some cases with sadistic delight. 
1Stanley L. Falk brings this out with great clarity in his book, 
Bataan: The March of Death, (New York: Norton, 1962). 
2See Appendix B . 
3see Appendix C. 
4See Appendix D. 
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When MacArthur was informed of the brutal details, he 
authorized the release of the story to the press so that the public could 
be informed. Strangely enough, it never made the front pages of the 
press. The story had been 11killed11 by orde rs from Washington which 
prohibited the release of prisoner-of-war atrocities to the press. 
MacArthur, who was very critical of this new policy, dubbed it 
11Managed News, 11 explaining : 
The administration, committed to a Europe-First effort, 
feared American public opinion would demand a greater reac-
tion against Japan, but whatever the cause, here was the 
sinister beginning of the managed news concept of those in 
power.l 
In a week of reporting the last stand of the Bataan defenders, 
the press, in banner headlines, informed a disbelieving American 
public of Bataan1 s eventual fall and tragic end. The news brought 
frustration, shock, grief, and a great deal of soul searching. 
Of all the eulogies and tributes spoken, none seem to voice 
the thoughts and feelings of most Americans better than the one ex-
pressed by MacArthur. In his tribute to the defenders of Bataan, he 
stated: 
The Bataan forces went out as it would have wished, fighting 
to the end of its flickering, forlorn hope. No army has done so 
much with so little, and nothing became it more than its last 
hours of trial and agony. To the weeping mothers of the dead, 
I can only say that the sacrifices and halo of Jesus of Nazareth 
has descended upon their sons, and that God will take them 
lchicago Tribune, 15 September 1964, Sec. I, p. 8. 
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unto himself. I 
In such words did MacArthur reveal the depth of his own feelings and 
at the same time his failure to come to the aid of his fallen comrades. 
It also revealed a compassion for the grieving, weeping mothers and 
wives of the fallen heroes. 
The tragic fact, as revealed by the numerous headlines and 
editorials, was that the American nation was not ready to discipline 
itself to make a sacrifice comparable to that of the enemy. 
The American public was sarcastically reminded by the Nash-
ville Banner that ' 'no bombs fall here," and while the situation was be-
coming critical in the Philippines, "some were striking, picketing and 
delaying production." And furthermore, continued the Banner, "while 
social gains were being debated in Congress and on soap boxes in pub-
lic parks, millions were counting and s p ending the booty--the bounty 
and bonus of overtime. 11 2 
A second shaft came from the Philadelphia Inquirer: "What is 
the matter with us? Where is our spirit? When are we going to wake 
up to the fact that Ame rica is engaged in a life and death str uggle and 
that she has not begun to fight? 11 3 The Burlington Free Press viewed 
"life as a gleam of time between two eternities. 11 The important thing 
a bout life, the Free Press continued, "is not how long it lasts but the 
1His com.ments were carried in practically all newspapers. 
For exampl e , see Washington Post, 11 April I 942, p. I, among many. 
2 9April 1942, p. 22 . 3 11 April 1942, p. I. 
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spirit in which it is lived, and the men of Bataan have, in life, given 
their utmost in their country1 s service. 111 
The Louisville Times called it the shame of 130,000,000 peo-
ple, and stated: It is the shame of a nation which gave responsibilities 
to a possession without underwriting its assumption with military force. 112 
Tragic as the news of Bataan1 s fall was to the nation, it was particularly 
heartbreaking to New M exico which had provided almost 2,000 of her 
native sons to the defending forces. 
The New York Times knew of no reversal in American history 
"so g reat as this one. 113 Of the 53,400 prisoners taken, 5,553 were 
Americans. Although the fall of Bataan was considered by the Los 
Angeles Times as a considerable reversal for the Allied cause, it was 
no reason for discouragement. "It is only page one, 11 stated the Times. 
"The chapter that will tell the story of the Philippines is unfinished. 114 
The Pittsburg Courier pointed out that the major part of the forces on 
Bataan consisted of Filipinos and "that less than 10,000 of the almost 
37,000 troops on Bataan were Americans. 11 5 
The Miami H erald, in paying tribute to the gallantry and her-
oism of the American soldiers and to MacArthur1 s spectacular defense 
in the Philippines, observed: 
l 11 April I 942, p. 4. 2 10 April 1942, p. 6. 
3 10 April 1 942, p. 6. 4 10 April 1942, p. 4. 





Praise and honor is also due others who kept up the necessary 
part of the defense. There were sixteen generals in addition 
to Wainwright on Bataan and Corregidor, manyUTNJ.01M.1 to most 
Americans but genuine heroes just the same. 1 
One of the administration1 s severest critics, Colonel Robert 
McCormick of the Chicago Tribune, maintained that the loss there was 
an unbelievable commentary on the " lack of foresight of bureaucracy, 11 
and that it was sacrificed to the "myopia of bureaucracy. 112 The 
Pittsburg Courier, one of the administration1s strongest supporters, 
said the statement was a distortion of facts and in commenting on both 
the McCormick and Hearst publications, implied that both were obstruc-
tionists and that personal dislike, particularly by Mr. Randolph H earst, 
of Mr . Roosevelt was such that not "even a war of national survival" 
could resolve it. 3 
1 1 7 April 1942, p. 6. 
2 11 April 1942, p. l. 
3 18 April 1942, p. 13. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SURRENDER OF THE PHILIPPINES 
The withdrawal to the beaches and the evacuation of personnel 
to the relative safety of Corregidor was one of confusion, disorganiza-
tion, and harrowing experiences. Although the end was inevitable, the 
unbelievable swiftness of the Japanese and the suddenness of King1 s 
surrender made orderly withdrawal an impossibility. 
All through the seemingly endless night, the retreating defend-
ers trudged their weary way to the rendezvous point. Many defenders 
never made it and were cut off from their haven by the pursuing Japa-
nese who were determined to prevent the defeated troops of Bataan 
from reaching the bay forts. Those who were captured merely exchanged 
the hardships of the battlefield for those of a Japanese prison camp, an 
experience all found degrading. 1 The lucky ones made it to Corregidor 
or to the other bay forts, but there they found only temporary sanctuary. 
Only the dead found peace. 
Of the newspaper accounts depicting the night1 s happenings, 
1 Baehr 1 s Letters, 31 October 1944. In this letter Major 
Baehr, after two and one half years as a prisoner of war, remarked: 
"If there is anything lower or more useless than a prisoner of war of 




the most gripping was that from the pen of Dean Schedler of the Chi-
cago Tribune: 
All night long they came to escape striken Bataan for the 
comparative safety of Corregidor. All who dared made the 
trip to the fortress as they fled the hell fires of Bataan. 
They came across in row boats. Some swam, braving 
the shark infested waters, and were picked up in mid-channel. 
All the while Japanese bombers dropped their bombs or 
viciously machine-gunned the channels.l 
Although King 1 s surrender ended all organized resistance on 
Bataan, the Japanese were still denied their objective--Manila Bay, 
the Pearl of the Orient. However, with Bataan in Japanese hands, 
Corregidor now became vulnerable to both air assaults and to the 
merciless artille ry shelling from the Japanese guns which were strate-
gically located on the high grounds in southern Bataan. The damage 
caused by the aerial bombing was small in comparison to the extensive 
damage caused by the accuracy of the big artillery pieces. 
Corregidor, the location of Ft. Mills and Wainwright1 s head-
quarters, was the most important of the four bay forts. 2 It had been 
considered an inde structible and impregnable barrier; however, with 
the arrival of the airplane it became vulnerable from the air. It is a 
small island about three and one-half miles long by one and one-half 
miles at its wides t point. Its landing field could accommodate only 
small planes. Its proximity to Bataan--about two miles from its 
1 10 April 1942, p. 1. 




southern tip--and i ts strategic location in the bay made it the key to 
the American-Filipino defense on Bataan. The New York Times re-
marked that 11 the natives called it the 11 home of the big guns. ,,1 
In comparing Corregidor to Malta, the Providence Journal 
observed: 
Corregidor, although physically like Malta, lacks the 
concentration of anti-aircraft guns and fighter plane protec-
tion. Malta, unlike Corregidor, is regularly supplied by 
English convoys. 2 
The Minneapolis Star Journal scored this same point when it stated: 
11Airplanes, land-based nearby, have been battering the Island of 
Malta since 1939 and it has not fallen yet. It is still far too early to 
give up the Philippines as wholly lost. 113 
In the first two weeks of January, Corregidor was bombed ex-
tensively from the air by high-flying Japanese planes. However, its 
odd shape and its scanty area of five square mile s made a very small 
target and Japanese pilots and bombardiers dropped most of their bombs 
in the bay. From the middle of January to about the middle of March 
activity was materially reduced. However , the reduction in aerial 
bombing was offset by an increase in the number of artillery bombard-
ments against the bay forts. The reason given for the aerial lull dur-
ing February by the Manila Tribune was the Japanese 11need of planes 
and personnel to facilitate the prosecution of the Pacific conflict on 
12 9 March 1942, P· 6. 
3 15 January 1942, p. 12. 
2 10 April 1942, p. 7. 
,1 1~ ,, 
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other fronts . 11 1 
On 13 March, the Miami Herald reported that Corregidor suf-
fered the ''world's worst bombing. 11 Several days later the Japanese 
zeroed in their larger and more powerful guns on Corregidor and be-
gan to bombard the island on an all- day basis. Then in the last week 
of March the Japanese introduced a new bomber and a new shuttle 
system which subjected Corregidor to continual high-level bombings 
from noon until midnight. The damage from these hit and run raids 
proved negligible and caused little damage to Corregidor. During the 
first week of April, the Japanese concentrated their maximum efforts 
on the destruction of the forces on Bataan, and lessened their aerial 
attacks against Corregidor. 
The Japanese, flushed with their success in Bataan, were 
· · f C egi"dor and to force its defenders to anxious to begin the se1ge o orr 
their knees. On 10 April the New York Herald Tribune reported that 
d r te rs were surprised at Japant s many office rs in MacArthur's hea qua 
sudden success on Bataan fo r they had not read in Wainwrightts reports 
• • 11 On 13 April, MacArthur 
a "worsening of the defenders• position. 
t of Bataan
1s fall to . h 11 the irnpor ance 
pointed out in a message to Mars a 
Corregidor: 
. d t · ·tely limited and its de-
15 e 1n1 d 
The life of this fo r tress . ation can be restore • 
cornrnun1c . 
s true ti on certain unless sea t be prepared for the 
. h d you mus 
If Llris cannot be accornphs e ' 
1 11 April 1942, P• B. 
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fall of the harbor defenses. 1 
Corregidor 1 s defenders, with feelings of apprehension and 
sensing that their days were nUinbered, fought back with everything at 
their disposal. Corregidor 1 s big guns threw back round for round and 
continued to inflict heavy damage and casualties on the Japanese. 
Wainwright sent a message to his troops in which he ruled out all 
questions of a surrender. He vowed that the bay forts would be de-
fended to the end. 
The Cleveland Plain Dealer commented that 11in holding out 
hope to his men, 11 Wainwright emphasized, 11Corregidor can and will 
be held. 112 The worst destruction and the greatest fear in the hearts 
of the defenders were caused by the merciless and plunging fire of the 
big 240 mm Japanese guns 3 that were looking straight down on their 
target from the high ground on Bataan. 
The Nevada State Journal saw no difference between living on 
Corregidor or living on an artillery bull1s-eye. The paper then added 
that Lieutenant Colonel Warren Clear, an eyewitness to the attacks on 
Corregidor, remarked that 11 Corregidor would be the target of every-
thing the Japanese can throw at them. These men have resisted far 
above and beyond the call of duty. 114 Another newspaper described 
1Radio MacArthur to M arshall, No. 228, 13 Apr 42, AG 384. 3 
GHQ SWPA.; Morton, Philippines , p. 521. 
2 15 April 1942, p. 8. 3Equal to approximately 9 1/2 inches. 
4 13 April 1942, p. 1. 
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Corregid 
or as being the "seething crater f t· l o an ac 1 ve vo cano and like 
the crater of 
a volcano, Corregidor today is seething under loads and 
loads o 
f b<:nlbs and shells being dumped on it by Japanese bombers and 
When the seige of Corregidor began, the American-Filipino 
Personn 
el on the island, unlike the emaciated troops on Bataan, were 
i:n llo d 
anger of starvation. In reporting on the adequacy of food and 
the 
l'l'lora1e of the "The morale of 
the 
troops, the New York Times stated: 
troops in Manila Bay is high and the limited stocks of food are 
rigidl r . 
y ationed, but all get enough to eat. The food is simple but 
good 
' rnonotonous but nourishing. 112 
By the first week of May the situation on Corregidor was 
Each succeeding day brought conditions closer and closer to 
the po· 
lnt of no return. The nation's press which had r elegated the Philip-
Pi:ne 
e · k Plc, since the fall of Bataan, to the bac pages, was once more 
h.eadl. . . 111mg the unfolding drama in Marula Bay on the front pages. 
About midnight of 5 May, after a day of intensive bombing and 
Shelling, the J b their final assault on Corregidor. The apanese egan 
attack proved so damaging that the beach defenses, unable to withstand 
the cascading destruction, simply crumbled and fell to the ground. 
When the t f the enemy touched Corregidor roop-crammed barges o 
there ts The New York Times re-
Was little to impede their moveroen • 
P0 J:ted th ·n progress, Wainwright informed 
at even as the assault was 1 
1Manila Tribune, 17 April 1942' p. 
3
• 
2z3 April 1942, p. 4. 
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Washington "th . 
at a landmg attack was in progress. 11 1 
edition th T· 
e _unes 
thi:ee h 
ours to complete the invasion and capture all bay forts. 2 
In a subsequent 
estimated that it took the Japanese forces thirty-
On 6 May, a message from President Roosevelt to Wainwright, 
while .. 
pxa1s 1ng the gallant commander and his heroic troops, had the 
OV-ertones 
of a farewell: 
s . • • • I have been following your heroic stand • • • • In 
h Plte of all the handicaps, lack of food and ammunition you 
a a;e given a shining example of tenacity, resourcefulness, 
n steadfast courage • • • • Every soldier, sailor, and 
~axine are inspired by the gallant struggles of their comrades 
ln the Philippines. You and your devoted followers have be-
cor:ne 1i . . Vmg symbols of our war aims and tbe guarantee of 
V1ctory. 3 
Wainwright later wrote that during the intensive bombing and 
bomb 
a:rdrnent he was so amazed at the number of bombs and shells that 
fell on 
Cor:i;-egidor, 11 he did not believe the tempo could be further in-
ci:ea 
Sed. rr4 To his f b . d surprise, in one twenty- our our per10 approxi-
mately 16, ooo .d 5 b t 1 shells of all calibers fell on Corregi or, a ou e even 
shells . 
a tn1nute. To prevent further bloodshed and unnecessary loss 
Of life 
' Wainwright decided to surrender Corregidor. After surrender 
1
6 May 1942, p. 1. 2g May 1942, p . 4. 
f 
3This e ·ved widespread publicity in all the papers o th message rec 1 . . G 1 . at date It . 1 t d ·n full in Wainwright, enera Wam-~htis .c:::.1--:_~ 1s a so quo e 1 
~, p. 118. 
4 W · . h G~~~~~W~a1~· n~w:,:r::..::i:.1:2g~h~tt...:.s_S.c...t_o_r_._y, pp. 110- I 2. a1nwr1g t, -= enera 
SH t f Operation, p . 69; Morton, Philip-
J>i:oes, arbor Defense Repor o 
~ p . 547. 
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arrange 
ments had been made , he informed Washington of his actions. 
In h· 
ls anguish he stated: 
h With broken heart and head bowed in sadness but not in 
~ ame, I must a r range te r ms for the sur r ender of the fortified 
:~lands of Manila Bay. My troops and I have accomplished all 
at is humanly possible, and we have upheld the best traditions 
of the United States and its Army. With profound regret and with 
continued pride in my gallant troops, I go to meet the Japanese 
commander l . 
The New York Herald Tribune remarked that the decision which 
kept W . . 
amwright on Corregidor was his own. It had been suggested that 
he leave C . . . orreg1dor and continue the fight elsewhere as a commander 
of troops. To have left his men would have been no per sonal disgrace, 
Since 
a precedent for such action had been set already by MacArthur. 
It w 1 
ou d have saved for the Allied cause in the Pacific one of the United 
t'iation i f t · . 
s most able gener als and spared him r om was mg away rn a 
J a Pane . d h t · t · se prison camp. The Herald Tribune reporte t a m urnmg 
down th · · ht t t d e suggestion to leave Correg1dor, Wainwng s a e : 
I have been one of the I battling bastar ds of Bataan.' _r 
have been with my men from the start and if captured I will 
share their lot. We have been through so muc_h that my_ 2 
conscience would not let me leave before the final curtam. 
Th . 1 for the Philippines was over, e long and grim strugg e 
appr 0 · b With Corregidor and the ~ately 184 days from when it egan. 
0 ther b h J panese Navy was able finally to 
ay forts in their control, t e a 
sail. 
lnto .Manila Bay. 
. T ·bune from its vantage point, 
The Mamla n ' 
lw . 1 Wainwright's Story, pp. 122 - 23. 
a1nwright, !;G~e~n~eE_r~a~~~~.::Ji.::.=.~--..... 
2 
7 .May 1942, p . 2. 
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remarked the 11 units of the Japanese Navy steamed into Manila Bay for 
the first time on 9 May. 11 1 
During the period in which Wainwright was in command of the 
Philippines, an interesting aspect of news reporting and the power of 
the press in making heroes was reveal ed. Two examples are the Chi-
cago Herald American and the New York Times. The Herald American, 
whose headlines very often bannered MacArthurts local victories as 
major engagements , made scant mention of Wainwrightts efforts. When 
Corregidor underwent its heavy attack on 3 May and American troops 
were fighting for their lives, the Herald American had little to say. 
On 5 May, it noted Correg~dor1 s final hours in one small statement on 
page one and in a small article of seventy words under the heading 
llCorregidor S till Defies Jap Blast, 11 on page two. 
The New York Times followed somewhat the same pattern. 
While MacArthur commanded the Philippine defenders , the Philippine 
epic and MacArthur rated approximately eighty-five mentions , of which 
forty-two were page one headlines or stories . When Wainwright suc-
ceeded MacArthur in mid-March, the Philippine epic up to its final 
surrender received less than fo r ty mentions of which twenty were page 
one news, and most of these were focused on the £all of Bataan and 
Corregidor. Wainwright r emained one of the unsung heroes of the 
Philippine story. 
During Corregidor's last days when it was being swamped 
l 10 May 1942, p. I. 
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with a cross-fire that withered away its beach defenses, splintered its 
fortification and rained death and destruction on its soil and personnel, 
most of the nation1 s press turned elsewhere for its lead stories. 
On 6 M ay when the end came, the story of Wainwright1 s Cor-
regidor defense became page one news again in practically all American 
newspapers. The Chicago Herald American heralded the loss in three-
inch headlines, eight columns wide, reading 11 CORREGIDOR LOSS -
7, 000 YANKS _ 5 SHIPS. " In the same issue there appeared directly 
over the main headline a rar e red bannered lead line, seven colu1nns 
wide which read ''With My Men - Wainwright. 11 Most newspapers head-
lined the loss of Corregidor, but for all practical purposes, other than 
several days of soul searching by a nation and its press, the Philippine 
story was finished. It had b een a focal point for news and it had pro-
vided rnore than its share of page one banner headlines, particularly 
under the l eadership of MacArthur, but now it was not even of secondary 
importance to new events. 
The New Haven Journal Courier, apologizing for the American 
press 1s neglectfulness of Corregidor, stated: 
Developments e lsewhe re in the great struggle girdling the 
globe distracted attention from the r es olute little band on 
Corregidor. The last lone stand of those American and Fili-
pinos on Corregidor, in a sense forgotten in the onrush of war 
elsewhere, was part and parcel of the siege of Bataan. 1 
The American press saw e lements of both gains and of profound 
weaknesses in Japants Philippine victory. First and foremost was that 




her strength was spread thinly over a vast area which would become 
more and more dependent upon her ever increasing line of communica-
tion. Secondly, by winning all this space she had in no way increased 
her over-all strength. The newspapers a l so saw the fall of Bataan, 
Corregidor, and the Philippines as marking the zenith of Japanese ef-
forts and the low point of American efforts in the Pacific theater . 
The surrender of Corregidor, as in the case of the fall of 
Bataan brought on both praise and eulogies from a grateful nation. It 
also resulted in charges and countercharges as to who was to b lame for 
the disaster. The Cleveland P lain Dealer reported that a note of bitter -
ness was injected in Congress by Representative Charles I. Faddis (D-
Pa.) who charged that Bataan and Corr egidor fell because of a 11blunder-
ing, muddling, indecisive policy of selfish isolationism and pacificism 
in the United States. ,il 
The Arizona Republic stated: "The unexpected has happened. 
Corregidor has fallen and in conjunction with Bataan, there is a limit 
to human endurance. The loss of Bataan and Corregidor are monu-
ments to a false philosophy. 112 The Denver Post declared: 11Even the 
bravest of men must have something more than bare hands with which 
to fight. 11 Then it added: 11 The loss of Corregidor is the direct result 
of the American plan of concentrating first on the knockout of Hitler in 
18 May 1942, P• 8. 
27 May 1942, Section II, p. 8. 
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Europe and allowing the Japanese war to slide along.
11
1 
The Daily Argus-Leade_E. obserged that neither Wainwright nor 
hi s men had a 
chance to win against the overwhelming power of the 
str'k' 1 ing force 
of the Japanese. The paper considered the lack of ade-
ir defense as one of the main causes of the loss of the Philip-
quate a· 
pines: ••The 
Japanese had so completely dominated the air and the sea 
.ef on any scale has been 1mposs1ble. 
112 
that relj:, . . 
Other newspapers expressed the los s of the Philippines as one 
of ou r greatest defeats and as a cause for national remorse, The Chi-
-----== referred to our defeats at the hands of the Japanese as 
~ago Tl';i...,,...., "" 
such as never before been inflicted on our forces in our national 
l i d efeats 
history. 
At Bataan and Corregidor we surrendered rnore rnen and equip-
an m any other battle or seige," In evaluating the air strikes 
ment th · 3 





f J t'll s opinion that " it was the plunging fire o apanese ar 1 ery that 
Wrecked his defenses and not Japanese air power. ,,4 There was a tendency 
all th:r 1 
ough World war 
11 
to overrate the destruction of aeria bombing, 
the effects of which were ,nor e psychological than actual, 
The o St t n believ-ed that the outcome was inevitable 
regon a es~ 
au
d 
nothing h . relief expedition could have saved Cor-
s ort of an extensive 
regido:r . It 
· . . t the intention of our leaders to send 
rmphed that 1t was no 
26 MaY 1942, P• 2. 
l 6 May 1942, p. 2. 47 MaY 1942, Section II, pp. 2, 3. 
3 7 May 1942, p. 14. 
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such an expedition for ire ·d 1 
orregi or no onger was of first rank signifi-
cance '' N • or l d 
cou the §_!atesman see any victory, moral or otherwise ' 
in 0 ur defeat: 11
No matter how heroic the men of Corregidor were, its 
surr ender is 
a defeat for we have not been able to mass effective power. 
There the enemy is stronger.
111 
The Daily Oklahoman, reflecting a deep bitterness at our loss, 
1 
ed Corregidor as the "last outpost in the wor ld that can be lost 
descr·b 
United Nations without gravely endangering the whole cause." As 
by the 
Xlmand to those at nome- - leader s and public alike--it stated: 
a rep · 
d 
st
rong points cannot be indefinitely surrendered. On the 
1 
ay that Corregidor surrendered--starved out, there was a 
.;:;e. strike in a Massachusetts _defense plant, and official 
hington was still playing politics W1th national safety by 
toadying to labor racketeers and spendthrift boondogglers. 
Off· · 
icial Washington still fiddles and compromises. 
The 0 klah oman interpreted our 
defeat as humiliating evidence of 
11
too 
little and too late. 112 
When MacArthur heard of the final outcome, he gave unstinting 
:Pra· 1Se t ·o the fallen defenders : 
Corregidor has sounded its own storY at the rnouth of its 
guns. It has scrolled ;ts own epitaph on enemy tablets. But 
through the bl oody haze of its Jast reverberating shot 1 shall 
always seem to see the vision of ;ts grim, gaunt, and ghastly 
rnen still unafraid. 3 
The Denver post, in a few shOrt words before the fall of 
------
23 May 1942, p. 12. 
3 h ~w y
0
rk r;mes, 7 MaY 1942, P• 3, the 
Pro . See for example t e . e h d ~dence Globe among many on t e same ate. 
Journal, the ~, 
I 7 May 1942, p. 4. 
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Corregidor, had summed up the consensus of the American press when 
it stated: "Frankly speaking we still have to formulate a definite strate-
gy. ,,l The comments of the American press seemed to imply that the 
administration l eaders, notwithstanding six months of war experience, 
were still bungling along and had learned nothing from the Bataan 
debacle. 
Wainwright1 s final decision on 6 May to surrender to the Japa-
nese did not bring an immediate end to all resistance in the Philippines. 
The effectiveness of American-Filipino resistance and harassment was 
reflected in the prolonged Japanese refusal to complete surrender nego-
tiations with Wainwright until all American-Filipino units in the archi-
pelago had laid down their arms and surrendered on Japanese terms. 
By the end of the first week in June, the Japanese were in possession 
of the major islands of the archipelago. 2 On 9 June , the Japanese were 
finally satisfied that all formal r esistance had ceased and in a curt 
:message to Wainwright stated: "Your command ceases and you are 
now . 113 a prisoner of war. 
For all practical purposes, this ended a campaign that had 
been grossly underrated by the Japanese and scheduled to last about 
Sixty days. The victory which Homma eagerly had sought was 
-------------------- ----
13Mayl942, PP• z, 30 
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eventually achieved about six months after the first Japanese soldier 
landed on Philippine soil. Japan now controlled the Philippines. Her 
troops had conquered a nation but not its people. Japan had destroyed 
Filipino liberty but she could never kill the Filipino1 s courage or banish 
from his mind MacArthur's deeply etched promise 111 shall return. 11 
No matter how hard the Japanese tried, they were never com-
pletely successful in dominating the Philippines or its people. Although 
the Japanese held the main centers, American and Filipino guerrilla 
bands continued to harass the Japanese conquerors. The new masters 
had become victims of their own indiscretions. They were experienc-
ing a lesson learned by all insatiable conquerors that conquered fron-
tiers led to new borders and these in turn led to new horizons and to 
new fighters of freedom who refuse to be overcome. 
Japants problem was to make the right decision. Her master-
minds in Tokyo were becoming more and more aware that the questions 
of war and strategy were not quite as simple as they had appeared to 
be in the blush of the first victories. Japanese commanders realized 
that MacArthur ts presence in Australia represented an ominous sign 
and a threat that had not been consider ed in their original plans of con-
quest. 
A large nwnber of A1nerican newspapers were convinced that 
With MacArthur in Australia, Japants next efforts would be in that di-
rection. This fee l ing a l so prevailed in Australia where the Australians, 
from the highest to the lowest, were firmly convinced that a Japanese 
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inv-as. 
ion of their countr y was imminent. 
Japan . 
The Em . D ·1 - poria a1 y Gazette had prophesied many p r oblems for 
In March the paper had stated: 
Japanr . To pla ·t s success requires that she pr otect her triumphs. 
llla b Y 1 safe the attack must go on against Austr alia and 
e r 1,: e New Zealand. But in this decision lies the danger of 
Colo~· Japan will find Austr alia har de r to subdue than 
ing t1al lands. Here she will be faced by Austr alians fight-
o save their homeland.1 
. The B-iclunond Times Dispatch had obser ved in Apr il that all 
l.lldicati 
ons Pointed to the invasion of Por t Moresby in New Guinea, then 
Of 1'f 
ew Caledonia, New Zealand, and finally Australia. The Dispatch 
v-· 
tewed th· 
ls as no cause for alarm. Like most Amer ican newspapers, 
the 
Paper b 1· e 1eved that MacArthur would make the difference between 
\ric tot· 
y or defeat for the Austr alians. 2 
The alarm and apprehension among the Japanese because of 
the d 
eveloping American offensive in Austr alia was interpreted by the 
Chj 
~ to mean that the Japanese would increase their effort 
to C 
U.t our lines of communication with Australia by carrying out "naval 
OJ>e:rati 
0 ns directed from the Gilbert and Mar shall I slands through the 
Solo 
lllons and the New Hebr ides. 113 A month earlier this same news-
P<tper ha 
d reniarked: 
It is fantastic to think in terms of a Japanese invasion ~f 
1 
Austral· b t 1 points in the north. Australia s 1a eyond some coas a 
l 
16 March 1942, p. 4. 
22 April 1942, p . l. 
3 
4 May 1942, p. 114. 
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west c~ast cannot be blockaded except by cornplete control of 
the Inchan Ocean. An attempt to blockade Australia would 
scatter the enemy1s forces and expose them to disastrous 
hazards.I 
Japan carried out regular harassing air raids and bombing at-
tacks against the Port Darwin area in North Australia but she made no 
attempt to invade the island continent itself. The initiative had been 
tal · <en out of her hands by MacArthurrs sweeping change of Australia1s 
passive defense plans. He not only discarded the Brisbane defensive 
line, behind which the Australians would make their last stand, but 
carried the offensive a thousand miles further north into New Guinea 
Where he first blocked, then stopped, and finally rolled back the Japa-
nese invaders. Australia had been saved and he was on his way to ful-
fill his promise to the Filipinos that he would return to the Philippines. 
E d 
me additional progress, the zenith 
ven though they ma e so 
of th h d wi· th the fall of Corregidor. The 
e Japanese conquest was reac e 
c . on 9 June concluded for the Japa-
o:rnpletion of the Philippine campaign 
nese t st conquests in the annals of mili-
war machine one of the grea e 
t 
. nt of the vaunted Nazi war 
ary h · 1 shme 1story. Even the accomp 1 
or achievement. Other than 
ma ch· · agnitude ine could not compare 111 m 
. mpletely disrupted, the 
in th . . . tabl e was co 
e Philippines where its time 
. 1 General Headquarters 
rigid t· h d by the rmperia 
·ime schedule, establis e 
t but surpassed in some 
to ga. was not only me 
in assigned objectives, like falling dominoes. 
. after another 
instances as key objectives fell one -------------
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inneapolis Star Jour nal, 6 May 1942; Los Angeles Times, 10 
show 942, Part II, p. 4. In part from both. The nwnber of days 
the rn n ~eflect the days taken to capture the objective after it became 
Pin ain target. Formal operations were not completed in the Philip-
es llntil 9 June. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
The · ep1c of MacArthur's defense of the Philippines is a 
ull.ique t 
s o.:i:y unparalleled in the military history of the United States 
<l:nd 
cannot be 
explored in its entirety from official written documents 
01' Otb 
e1· confl. . 1ct1ng works which for one reason or another leave many 
qlle s t1· ons 
unanswered. 
Tb· ls paper, in turn, has touched on only the bare summary of 
ev-ents . 
121 the over-all Pacific effort. Its purpose is not to praise, con-
de:n-i n, 
o.:i: ac · li b t quit any one person, agency, or po cy ut to present 
·hose 
facts as gleaned from the American press which may add some-
tlq 
:ng of \ralue to what already has been written about MacArthur and 
h:is f· 
lght ag . C .d 
a1nst the .Japanese on Bataan and orreg1 or. 
The :importance and value of a study of this nature is that the 
Pl'es s, p 





ProVide the public with tbe prejudices and emotions of the 
Pei:ioc1 . 
day and of those who make history. Such press ac-
Yet in writing a study from sensational wartime headlines and 
car ·d the danger of developing a warped e must be taken to avo1 
Sell 
Se of hi le without taking due credit 




J fro.rn G 
eneral MacArthur 1s genius as a military strategist and 
tactician 
, is th 
at the headlines and page one stories describing the 
Philipp· ine e . 
pie, in the early months of the Pacific conflict, focus 
ll'lostly o 
n MacArthur. With such unrivalled publicity, it is easy to 
d!'aw the 
wrong conclusions for the headlines gave the impression that 
M:ac.Arth 
ur Was the only general in the Philippines and was winning the 
Wa.:t s. 
ingle handed. There were sixteen other generals on Bataan who 
i:n .ll1. 
any cases provided MacArthur with much of the brainwork and 
11lilitary s . 
kill he needed during the spectacular withdrawal from the 
beach 
es and for the outstanding defense of Bataan. 
The headlines and stories also gave the impression that Mac-
A.:tthui: 
Was always in the field leading his troops. His only visit to 
13ata 
a:n Was .rnade on 1 o January for a quick inspection of the main 
battle . . . . . 
Positions. He spent most of his time m the Malinta tunnel on 
Col'.:te . 
gidor where his headquarters were located. However, by round-
lllg Off th e headlines and more emotional press stories, whose praises 
at tirn 
es reached adulation, with the more objective editorials valid 
deduct· 
l.ons can be drawn • 
.Regardless of what the headlines and the press stories re-
flected 
, Bataan was a defeat for MacArthur. Yet it was MacArthur 
Who 
Provided the spark and leadership from the early months of war, 
and Who f th eventual drive against the Japa-
acted as the catalyst or e 
l'lese in th In about three years he turned 
e Southwest Pacific Area. 











y a nd returned to the Philippines. 
The events on Bataan and in the Philippines cannot leave 
either th .. 
e Filipinos or the Americans other than highly gratified with 
thee 
ourage of their leaders and their defenders. Fighting against the 
ll'npossibl 
e they stopped a determined and overpowering foe who in 
quick su . 
ecess1on had struck a devastating blow against Pearl Harbor , 
Seized I-I 
ong Kong, Guam and Wake, captured Malaya and Singapore, 
inv-aded t 
he Netherland East Indies, and were in the process of taking 
0 ther 
al'eas in the Far East. 
By the middle of February, the Allied cause had sunk to a new 
low 
• It wa · h h A · s with a sense of foreboding t at t e mencan press and 
People 
Watched with apprehension as the Japanese juggernaut roamed 
th
e South p · d 1 · · tbi · · ac1fie at will, chewing up an pu venzmg every ng in its 
Path unt· . 
il it was momentarily halted by the defenders of Bataan. 
The Bataan defenders, poorly equipped against insurmountable 
Odds and fighting a hopeless battle, captured the imagination of the 
Atner. 
lean people and the press as nothing else could. It was, said one 
Atnel.'· 
lean paper, 11a beacon of light which shone forth in a stormy 
sea 111 
' and it was the only bright spot in the dismal picture of resound-
ing defeats. 
It was the strategy of the defenders and their tenacious stand 
0 :n .B · ·t f ataan that focused the attention of the American press on l s orce-
ful leader In ... ~...., the press found the ingredients 
, General MacArthur. ,u.,. ...... 






I Of a i·ead 
Y-made hero, a personality who showed strength not weak 
ness, cour 
age not f 
ear, who led not followed, and above all, 
Will· 
lng to carry on the torch of freedom. 
one who was 
MacArthur was well known to the American public for his 
daring eJcpl . 01 ts in World War I. An index of the strong impact he made 
on 
People 
can be seen in William Allen White 1s description of the 
Cenei-
al after h t eir first meeting at Cologne, Germany, in 1918: 
n Into this austere and formal situation flashed General 
0 tUglas MacArthur, aged thirty- eight, with a grace and charm 
c a stage hero. Never have I met before so vivid a man, so 
apti'vat· · · 
and J 1ng a man, so magnetic a man. He 1s all Barrymore 
0 hn Drew hope to be. And how he could talk. 1 
l'hes ewer 
e the words of a fifty year old veteran newsman and well 
know 11 
editor who was respected for his objectivity. 
In MacArthur, the people found a man who provided a ray of 
hop 
e and h w o by example gave renewed courage and faith. He personi-
fied th 




ctory. The high esteem and admiration that his countrymen had 
fol' h· 
llll Was manifested in many forms. Babies were named for him, 
lllany Pi-. d . h . h 




In March 1942 his name was used to bolster the lagging Red 
Ci:-oss . . 
br1v-e which an indifferent public had failed to support. It was 
asslltn 
ed that by using MacArthurrs name the public would dig deeper 
----------------~-
1-I 1walt J hn W'lliam Allen White 1s America, (New York: e.nl' er o son, ~:.;I~~~:,:.:~_:.:...=:..:..:..~----





into th . 
eu Pocket s. In the following month MacArthur buttons went on 
sale at tw 
0 
cents each over the counter and five cents each through the 
111.a "1 
l • Sales in th f 
e irst three weeks totalled 255, 940 in Chicago and 
2sa, 440 . 
in New York.1 There is no question that MacArthur had capti-
V-ated th . . 
e .unag1nation of the press and the public alike. MacArthur, 
alway-
s aware of the power of the press and being sensitive about 
his tor 
Y, did little to antagonize the press and much to ease its path. 
'l'he 
Press· . 1n turn gave him a press coverage unrivalled by most living 
111.ili tar 
Y- or Political leaders. 
The American press, with its fingers on the pulse beat of the 
llation 
' Was ahead of the administration in anticipating needed changes. 
It t 
Ook th 
e lead in the struggle to change the one-sided global strategy 
With it 
s ernphasis on the defeat of Hitler first and have it re-evaluated 
so that it b . 
ecame a global strategy m the true sense of the word. Even 
the 1V 
~' a consistent supporter of the administration, 
Pointed 
0 ut from time to time in its editorials that the global conflict 
Was 
an ''Indivisible" war and not a number one and number two war. 
M:ost ed· d f d B t 1torials called for continual aid to the e en ers on a aan. 
The amount of press support for MacArthur and the Pacific 
effort can b h unt of criticism against the ad.min-. e measured by t e amo 
i strat · · th · 1011 f The cr1·t1·cism 1n e main ques-or its conduct of the war• 
t· 
lolled th . t London "Europe First" policy. 
-------:_:alidity of the Washing on-






.Alth OUgh th 
Against the Administration 
For the Administration 
Against Congress 





e greatest amount of criticism came from the south and 
Southwest 
states where the revolt against the President was the great-
est it 
Was not . 
. restricted to this area, nor was the newspaper criticism 
%ited 
to a single political group as the following results will show. 
1ndependent Newspapers 









In the eyes of the American press our Pacific blunders were 
lfteate1: a 
nd costlier than those of the Japanese. Our first and greatest 
hlund 
ei:- wa · 
s 1n underestimating the Japanese. As a nation we placed 
too 1 
ow a V-alue · t· Th on his skill, strength, and imagma 10n. e second 
l'ilistak 
e Was that of a leadership which was r eluctant to heed a public 
op· 
lllion d .. 
emanding timely and adequate aid to the Pac1f1c and MacArthur. 
l'he:t 
e Were no illusions among the American press about the need for 
l'ei.nf 
O:tcements in the Pacific theater. Urgency and its synonyms were 
i:ndeed 
the words on every tongue, and every eye was upon the Pacific. 
-Alth 0
Ugh displeasure was voiced by many divergent groups, the admin-
istl.'at· 10n leaders in Washington still concentrated their major efforts 
tow 
a:td Europe. 
Ma A h · e with the ''Navy Brass" for its r e-c rthur took s arp 1ssu 
fusa1 . ·n1 






..llUr Was f" 
.h irmly convinced that the Japanese blockade could 
a"'e b 
een succ f 
th ess ully breached without excessive losses. In light of 
e actual 1 
tl osses at Pearl Harbor, MacArthur 1s conviction had very lit-
e "'alidity 
up to the invasion of Davao on 20 December and no validity 
aftei: the 111 . 
a 1n landings on 22 December. Our navy was at that time in 
llo Po . 
s1tion t . . 0 sa1l into the Philippines and challenge the Japanese Navy 
WJii 
ch had a 
superior naval arm and the advantage of land bases for 
both 
naval 
and army aircraft. 
While the American press expressed general approval of Mac-
A.tthui: 
and highly praised his conduct of tbe war, it was in the main 
h· 
lghJy cr ·1-.: 
l...1.ca1 of the administration and its leaders, not so much for 
their a. 
ll'ns to win the war but of their conduct of the war and of their 
leadexsh. 
lp. The press also raised questions about the political 
astuteness 
of the national leaders. Some editors were convinced that 
the 
A.tner · · ki .1.. lean leaders, because of political naiveness, were ma ng t..(..(e 
~~~a . 
Pawn in the hands of more able statesmen and devious agents. 
An A 
tlantic policy which sent troops to Great Britain and a Pacific 
Policy w . 
hich brought the Pacific conflict to within a measurable distance 
Of 0
"'el'-all defeat seemed ample proof to many that the administration 
lead 
ei:s had fallen under the power of sinister foreigners. 
Even though the emotional headlines misled the average reader 
Of the 
ti:-ue military situation in the Philippines for the first several 
lliollths of the war, the editorials rounded them off, and despite the 
back 




and the . 
intrusion of a wartime psychosis, the United States press, in 
the ni 
ain, gave a fairly accurate interpretation of the Philippine epic. 
In a final evaluation of the American press in gathering, 
anaJyz · 
ing, and reporting the news, it can be said that while the head-
lines 
ProVided the gist of the news which proved satisfying to the ad-
hei:-e t 
n s of headline theology, the editorials rounded out the sensational 
head1· 
ines and emotional stories and told the story of the Philippines 
WeJJ 
• And in telling the story the United States press helped to formu-
late and . 
guide public opinion. 
I 
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APPENDIX B 
lie.te . 
ls ex act 
copy of the Death Bataan 
In -Re : 
ORDER TO KILL BATAAN CAPTIVES 
On A ·1 p.ri 3rd, next year, 1942, our corps landed from Lingayen 
.Ba.,~ 
J a.nd jo· 
l3ata an. 
1ned to the battle at the western foot of Mariberes (sic) in 
"o . . n April 9th, Bataan fell at last, and sixty thousand prisoners 
We;i- . 
e 1.n the h 
. ands of the Japanese Army. In Manila an Army Order was 
lssued t 
o the effect that ••• "EVERY TROOP WHICH FOUGHT AGAINST 
Otrl{ A 
¾y ON THE BATAAN SHOULD BE WIPED OUT THROUGHLY, 
W~T 
HER HE SURRENDERED OR N OT, AND ANY AMERICAN CAPTIVE 
WJio,s 
UNABLE TO CONTINUE MARCHING ALL THE WAY TO THE 
Coivc 
£NTRA TION CAMP SHOULD BE PUT TO DEA TH IN THE AREA 
Zoo¼ 
E; TE Rs OFF THE illGHWA Y. " 
(Extracted from "Dawn of the Philippines" 
p. 14. by Nobuhiko Jimbo Colonel Japanese Army) 





INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES 
WASHINGTON, D 0 C. 20315 
LTC Anthony Masi, USA-Ret. 
41 Briarbrook Drive 
North Kingston, Rhode Island 02852 
Dear Colonel Masi: 
19 December 1967 
Thank you for sending me a copy of General Bluemel1s letter. 
I am still unconvinced of the authenticity of the alleged order. My 
doubts are based on several points. First of all, if the order was 
available, why was it not introduced into evidence in Homma1 s trial, 
where all sorts of far more dubious material was used? Second, if the 
order was issued, why was it not followed? Despite the brutalities 
inflicted by the Japanese, it is clear that no concerted policy of 
executing prisoners was carried out, and no other Japanese ever testi-
fied that he was ordered, as a matter of general policy, to kill prison-
ers. Although many of the prisoners died, the actual number who died 
between the surrender and the time the group reached prisoner camp 
represented only about 10% of the total captured, hardly indicative of 
a general policy to execute prisoners. Third, if there was a general 
policy to kill the prisoners, why did the Japanese prepare Camp O'Donnell 
to receive them, and why were assembly points prepared on the route 
to O'Donnell? If the prisoners were to be executed, southern Bataan 
was as good a place as any to do so. The military situation was such 
that it made little sense to detail large numbers of Japanese troops as 
guards and escorts if the prisoners were indeed to be executed. Fourth, 
has anyone seen the original of the alleged order, in Japanese? Or do 
we have only COL. Jinbo' s wor d that it was ever issued? Who trans-
lated the alleged order and how accurate is the translation? Did COL 
Jinbo make up a story about an order as a means of covering or excus-
ing his own actions? If he was indeed ordered to execute Roxas, why 
didn't he do so, or was the order he refers to only for a limited num-
ber of prisoners, and when was it supposedly issued? The fact that 
General Bluemel has "a copy of the order" doesn1t prove its authenticity. 
The material in Toland1s book refers only to the mistreatment of Blue-
mel and says nothing about any such order. (You are right, inci-
dentally, in assuming that Toland based much of his account on the 
153 
154 
(APPENDIX D, continued) 
ear1· ier Ver . 
and th sion of my book, written originally as a Master1s thesis 
en 1 ' en arged and rewritten later as a book.) 
Situat· For all of these reasons, plus my general knowledge of the 
Gene ion, I do not believe that the order described was ever issued by 
ra1 Homma. 
lam In ~esponse to your question about ICAF correspondence courses, 
fol'rntnclos1ng an information pamphlet (which includes an application 
s I hope that you and yours will enjoy a most pleasant holiday 
ea son. 
Sincerely, 
s/Stanley L. Falk 
STANLEY L . FALK 
Associate Professor, 
National Security Affairs 
Ltc 01 .A. 
41 13 . nthony Masi 
l\~ i-1a1·br 
~VO:tth . 0 ok Drive 
Kingston, R. I. 
Deai-




5 Colonial Ridge Drive 
M. R. No. 1 
Yardley, Pa. 1906 7 
27 November 1967 
1967, in I r:gret the delay in replying to your letter of 15 November 
alld oi:i . Which you requested my assistance in clarifying the validity 
gin of the order "To kill Bataan Captives". 
(~ed) n There is a Jap Colonel Nobuhiko Jinbo. Colonel Russell p 
-C\.eed h · l'eceiv-ed 
O 
er as hi~ address and has, thro~gh a Jap Dr. Tadski Yabe, 
0 :tde:r "to ~al authority to use in Reeder 1s History of World War II the 
kill Bataan Captives". 
Which th Colonel Jimbo wrote a book "Dawn of the Philippines" in 
a P.l'o . e order appeared. It pertained to Jinbo ls orders to execute 
l'elea ttllnent Filipino Manuel Roxas. I had dinner with Roxas after my 
seas .. 
pr1s1oner of war • 
.Iudge A copy of the order was given to me by Dean Sherry, a retired 
Wets of the Superior Court of California. Sherry, my very good friend 
a Pow . , 
Ce:rat· WJ.th most of the 3 years, 4 months and 20 days of our illcar-
alld lon. Sherry was a Major at the outbreak of the War with Japan 
1'he Was in charge of the Jap civilians interned in Manila, PI and vicinity. 
the y Were surprised and amazed that the treatment which was given 
i:t:ie.rn Was in accord with the Geneva Convention. Sherry has many 
· l'lds a · · d th · J D ls one lllongst these Japs. He has v1s1te em m apan. r. Yabe 
With J of them. He was a Doctor in the P. I. at the outbreak of our War 
apan and now lives in Japan. 
st-... I assure you that from personal, experience tbe order was 
... lct1 
ctnd . Y followed. Had I been unable to get up I would have been shot 
Sh killed there This incident is well described in "But Not In 
a.me" • . 




(APPENDIX D, continued) 
bought for 
ca11 L .b 95 cents. It is a Signet Book, published by the New Amer i-
'A..-a 1 rary. Th z 
.i.v.1. e part of Toland s book on Bataan and the Death 
rch is the best I have r ead. 
shots f" 1 was on the Death March for 3 days and 2 nights . I heard 
l'llinut Ired in the Filipino Column marching ahead of us and a few 
es later saw dead bodies with a bullet hole in their heads. 
uncalled the brutality practiced on Bataan prisoners was entir ely 
or. 
the t There has been too much wasted sympathy on the Japs for 
reatm ent they gave us. 
l'llen . There has been a hostility towards us in the State Depart-
tiv- t, 1n the Armed Services Committee in the House of Representa-
es and 
some parts of the Army. 
W-oi·ld The Philippine Army fought wit~ _the cast-off weapons of 
r \V War I, with some types of ammunition that seldom exploded. 
C
. OUld like to have seen the critics do any better under the same 
l:tcll.tn 
g stances and I believe most of them could not have done as ood I 
• n fact, they would have done wors e. 
Sincerely, 
s/ Clifford Bluemel 
CLIFFORD BLUEMEL 
Brig Genl, USA, RE T 
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